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Theorizing the Immigrant Child
THE CASE OF MARRIED MINORS
Medha D. Makhlouf †
INTRODUCTION
U.S. immigration law provides special protections, benefits,
and forms of relief for children. It also provides certain
marriage-based benefits and exclusions. Yet the most common
definitions of “child” in the Immigration and Nationality Act
make the existence of a married minor child into a legal
impossibility. In other words, married minor children are
variously treated as either married adults or unmarried children.
In the international humanitarian community, “child
marriage” refers to “a legal or customary union” in which
“one or both spouses is under the age of [eighteen].”1 Child
marriage is widely considered a human rights violation and a
form of gender-based discrimination.2 It is a problem that
† Assistant Professor of Law, The Pennsylvania State University, Dickinson
School of Law. My thanks to David Thronson, Elizabeth Keyes, M. Isabel Medina,
Sabrina Balgamwalla, Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, Farrin Anello, Natalie Chin, Aryah
Somers Landsberger, Elizabeth Badger, Katherine C. Pearson, and participants in the
Works-In-Progress sessions for this paper at the Immigration Law Teachers Workshop
and the AALS Clinical Conference for their helpful comments. I am grateful to Weiyue
Zhu for excellent research assistance.
1 U.N. POPULATION FUND, MARRYING TOO YOUNG: END CHILD MARRIAGE
11 (2012), http://www.unfpa.org/sites/default/files/pub-pdf/MarryingTooYoung.pdf
[https://perma.cc/MQL6-XETL] [hereinafter UNPF REPORT].
2 Id.; see G.A. Res. 69/156, Child, Early and Forced Marriage, ¶¶ 7, 11 (Jan.
22, 2015) (recognizing child, early, and forced marriage as a harmful practice that
violates human rights and that is inherently linked to gender inequalities); Convention
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women art. 16(2), Dec. 18,
1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 [hereinafter CEDAW] (outlawing child marriage); Convention
on Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age for Marriage and Registration of Marriages art.
2, Nov. 7, 1962, 521 U.N.T.S. 231 (requiring states parties to legislate a “minimum age
for marriage” and outlawing marriage of individuals under that age “except where a
competent authority has granted dispensation as to age, for serious reasons, in the
interest of the intending spouses”); G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, art. 16(1), Universal Declaration of
Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948) (recognizing the right of “[m]en and women of full age”
to marry); see also Convention on the Rights of the Child art. 24.3, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter CRC] (although not specifically prohibiting child marriage,
requiring states parties to “take all effective and appropriate measures with a view to
abolish traditional practices prejudicial to the health of the children,” which may be
interpreted to include child marriage).
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disproportionately impacts girls, both in terms of numbers
and health impacts.3 Worldwide, one in three girls in developing
countries is married before she turns eighteen years old, and one
in nine is married before she turns fifteen.4 Based on current
trends, the number of girls who are married worldwide is predicted
to increase over the next decade and a half.5
Child marriage happens for a variety of reasons.
International human rights observers and scholars have
concluded that the level of socioeconomic development in a
country is a determining factor in the age of first marriage for
girls and women.6 In developing countries, “female labor force
participation, women’s acquisition of formal education, and
urbanization” are all associated with a lower likelihood of early
marriage.7 These factors combat stereotypical gender roles that
characterize women as caretakers of the home and children
and men as providers for the family. Such stereotypes are one
source of the large age disparity between husbands and wives
in many societies. Based on these roles, female children may be
considered developmentally “ready” for marriage as early as
the onset of sexual maturity, while male children are
considered to need additional experience and maturity in order
to take on the responsibilities of a provider.8
When families do not feel that they have realistic
alternatives for their daughters—such as during wartime,
economic crises, or when a community considers itself under
threat—early marriage becomes more commonplace.9 For example,
some parents may choose to arrange early marriages for their
daughters in an attempt to protect them because unmarried girls
in certain societies face a higher risk of attack by sexual
predators.10 Gender inequality, which is often entrenched in culture
and tradition, is the root of the problem of child marriage.11
Nevertheless, there are also minors living in almost
every country in the world who would describe their decision to
marry as a free choice—a decision that is supported by the laws
UNPF REPORT, supra note 1, at 11.
Id. at 6 (excluding China from the category of developing countries).
5 Id.
6 See id. at 35.
7 See, e.g., Susheela Singh & Renee Samara, Early Marriage Among Women
in Developing Countries, 22 INT’L FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 148 (1996).
8 Annie Bunting, Stages of Development: Marriage of Girls and Teens as an
International Human Rights Issue, 14 SOC. & LEGAL STUD. 17, 27 (2005).
9 Id. at 25–26.
10 Elizabeth Warner, Behind the Wedding Veil: Child Marriage as a Form of
Trafficking in Girls, 12 J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 233, 242 (2011).
11 See U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, Preventing and Eliminating
Child, Early and Forced Marriage, ¶ 16, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/26/22 (Apr. 2, 2014).
3
4
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of most nations. Globally, twenty-one countries have a
presumptive age of marital consent for girls that is under
eighteen years old.12 Two countries do not have legislation
pertaining to a presumptive age of marital consent.13 In the
United States, the presumptive age of marital consent is
eighteen14 in all states except for Nebraska—where it is
seventeen—and Mississippi—where it is seventeen for males
and fifteen for females.15 These laws are based on the age at
which individuals are presumed to have acquired the decisional
capacity required for valid legal consent to marriage.16 Most
countries, including the United States, also have exceptions
that permit minors to marry under certain circumstances.17
The exceptions to the presumptive age of marital consent
reflect the viewpoint, based in contract law, that some
individuals under the age of eighteen are mature and
responsible enough to be married.18 The exceptions also reflect
an understanding that the social conditions that give rise to
decisions to marry early can vary tremendously and that these
circumstances can influence a married minor’s attitude toward
and future intentions about a marriage.

12 See MEGAN ARTHUR ET AL., WORLD POLICY ANALYSIS CTR., LEGAL PROTECTIONS
AGAINST CHILD MARRIAGE AROUND THE WORLD 14 (2013), http://machequity.com/wp-content/
uploads/2015/05/WORLD_Policy_Brief_Legal_Protections_Against_Child_Marriage_2015.pdf
[https://perma.cc/W9FF-LYUW] (indicating that Lebanon, Iran, Bahrain, Chad, Kuwait, Holy
See, and fifteen additional countries have laws permitting the marriage of girls under the age
of eighteen).
13 Id. at 5 (Saudi Arabia and Yemen).
14 Vivian E. Hamilton, The Age of Marital Capacity: Reconsidering Civil
Recognition of Adolescent Marriage, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1817, 1832 (2012).
15 MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-1-5 (2012); NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-102 (West Supp.
2015); Pamela E. Beatse, Commentary, Marital Rights for Teens: Judicial Intervention
That Properly Balances Privacy and Protection, 2009 UTAH L. REV. 625, 628 n.18 (2009)
(listing state statutes regulating marriage).
16 Hamilton, supra note 14, at 1850–52 (describing the development of
marriage law’s concept of marital capacity from the law of contract’s concept of legal
consent); see also Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005) (recognizing the
“comparative immaturity and irresponsibility of juveniles” justifying statutes
prohibiting individuals under the age of eighteen from inter alia marrying without
parental consent in almost every state).
17 Hamilton, supra note 16, at 1821 (depicting countries that have exceptions that
lower the legal minimum age to marry to under eighteen; these include parental consent,
religious or customary law, court approval, or pregnancy). In 2013, more than 430,000 U.S.
residents between the ages of fifteen and nineteen were married, divorced, separated, or
widowed. U.S. Census Bureau, Marital Status of People 15 Years and Over, by Age, Sex,
Personal Earnings, Race, and Hispanic Origin tbl.A1 (2013), https://www.census.gov/data/
tables/2013/demo/families/cps-2013.html [https://perma.cc/7DDN-F7UW] (follow hyperlink
to “All Races” spreadsheet).
18 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 12 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST.,
1981) (defining capacity as “the legal power which a normal person would have under
the same circumstances,” thus contemplating both legal capacity and mental
competency).
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The married, minor immigrant children who are the
subject of this article include non-U.S. citizens between the
ages of thirteen and seventeen who have a legally recognized
marriage in their country of origin and who are either already
physically present inside the United States or who seek to enter.19
It includes people under the age of eighteen who were married
under a wide variety of circumstances, including those whose
marriages were arranged, those who chose to marry and were
able to consent to marry under the minimum legal age of
marriage laws in their country, and those who obtained parental
consent to marry under exceptions to marriage laws. It does not
include people who were married as minors but who are now
adults, children who were forced into marriages, or minors in
marriages that would not otherwise be recognized by U.S.
Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS).20
The number of individuals who fall into this category
and who become involved in the U.S. immigration system is
difficult to estimate. However, records of the Department of
Homeland Security’s Office of Immigration Statistics (OIS)
regarding immigrants admitted to the United States as spouses
indicate that the number is not insignificant. Between 1973 and
2014, approximately 20,500 immigrants under the age of
eighteen obtained lawful permanent residence (LPR) status
based on their relationship with a spouse.21 This means that
USCIS has recognized 500 marriages per year, on average,
in which at least one spouse is a minor.22 Within this group,
married minors were most commonly admitted to the United
States as the newly arrived spouses of U.S. citizens.23 This
figure does not include the number of applicants for LPR status
whose petitions were denied for whatever reason; the number
19 The term “immigrant” has a very specific, technical meaning within
immigration law. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15) (2012) (defining the term as “every alien except
an alien who is within one of the following classes of nonimmigrant aliens”). It does not
include individuals who entered the United States on a temporary visa, among others.
See, e.g., id. § 1101(a)(15)(B) (describing a nonimmigrant as an alien “who is visiting
the United States temporarily for business or temporarily for pleasure”). While most
references to immigrants in this article are technically correct, at certain points I use
the term loosely to include individuals in the broad category of non-U.S. citizens who
aim to become U.S. citizens.
20 Certain relationships are not recognized as marriages by U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration Services, even if they are valid in the place of marriage. See, e.g., In re
H, 9 I. & N. Dec. 640, 642 (BIA 1962) (refusing to recognize polygamous marriages as a
matter of federal public policy).
21 Office of Immigration Statistics, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Persons
Obtaining Lawful Permanent Status by Selected Detailed Class of Admission for
Persons Under Age 18: Fiscal Years 1973 to 2014 (July 25, 2016) (on file with author).
22 See id.
23 Id.
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of married, minor immigrants who were admitted to other LPR
classes of admission; or any information about the number of
married minors who applied for nonimmigrant visas (i.e.,
temporary visas). Therefore, this figure underestimates the
true number of married, minor noncitizen children who have
sought to enter the United States over the last four decades.
This article analyzes the treatment of married minor
children in the immigration system in three contexts: as
beneficiaries of spousal petitions; as petitioners for spouses,
parents, and siblings; and as beneficiaries of parent-sponsored
petitions. It reveals that married minor children are typically
treated indistinguishably from married adults and when they
are treated as children, it is often to their detriment. Regardless
of the precise number of children affected by this discrepancy
in immigration law, this article argues that there are compelling
reasons for lawmakers to address it. The current, haphazard
treatment of married minor children under U.S. immigration law
suggests that lawmakers have not seriously considered this group
of potential immigrants and reflects the general incoherence of
immigration law’s treatment of children.
Part I of this article describes social and legal constructions
of childhood and marriage, with a focus on the assumptions
underlying the treatment of children in immigration law. Part II
examines inconsistencies in the treatment of married minor
children in common scenarios in the family-based immigration
system, which highlight the outdated assumptions about
dependency, marriage, and family that underlie the immigration
law’s constructions of children and women. Finally, Part III
proposes incremental reforms to certain family-based
immigration laws to address the double disadvantage that
married minor children face in the immigration system. These
reforms include identifying and amending laws that reflect an
outdated understanding of childhood; adopting a critical, childcentered approach to the treatment of married minors; and
expanding the rights of children as both petitioners and
beneficiaries in immigration law.
I.

SOCIAL AND LEGAL CONSTRUCTIONS OF CHILDHOOD

This part reviews social and legal constructions of
childhood from the perspectives of sociology and immigration
law, and how the ritual of marriage intersects with or affects
these constructions of childhood. A brief summary of the treatment
of children under immigration law is followed by an analysis of
the assumptions underlying this treatment.

1608
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Childhood and Child Marriage from the Perspective of
Sociology

There has never been a uniform conception of childhood.
Sociologists and historians of childhood have long recognized that
the concept of childhood is defined by social and historical context,
and is, therefore, a “social construct.”24 To say that childhood is
socially constructed does not mean that “[c]hildren as younger
members of the species” do not exist.25 Rather, it means that there
is nothing “natural” or universal about the characteristics
attributed to children in any given culture or time period.26 This
explains the great variation in the ways that age categories have
been understood across time and geography.27 For example, in
some societies, adolescence is not recognized as a distinct period
in the life cycle.28 In others, there is more than one age category
that is recognized between childhood and adulthood.29
The social construction of childhood provides a
mechanism, in addition to physiological and developmental facts,
to sort between children and nonchildren. The point at which a
person is no longer considered a child in any given society is
24 Allison James, From the Child’s Point of View: Issues in the Social
Construction of Childhood, in BIOSOCIAL PERSPECTIVES ON CHILDREN 45, 61 (Catherine
Panter-Brick ed., 1998) [hereinafter James, From the Child’s Point of View]; see also Jo
Bridgeman & Daniel Monk, Introduction: Reflections on the Relationship Between
Feminism and Child Law, in FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON CHILD LAW 1, 3 (Jo
Bridgeman & Daniel Monk eds., 2000) (describing discourses of childhood as culturally
specific and socially constructed); ALLISON JAMES, CHRIS JENKS & ALAN PROUT,
THEORIZING CHILDHOOD 5 (1998) (describing new sociological models of childhood as
having an awareness of the social and historical context of childhood); CHRIS JENKS,
CHILDHOOD 7 (1996) (describing childhood as a social construct that is contingent on
time and place).
25 James, From the Child’s Point of View, supra note 24, at 51–52.
26 Id. at 45–46, 51–52, 55; Annette Ruth Appell, Accommodating Childhood, 19
CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 715, 736–37 (2013) (“[T]he existence of a legal category for children
as well as its boundaries and the rights of and duties owed to children are not nature’s law,
but ‘political choices’ . . . .” (quoting Frances Olsen, The Myth of State Intervention into the
Family, 18 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 835, 844 (1985))); Bunting, supra note 8, at 21
(“[D]iscourses of childhood are culturally specific, socially constructed, and ‘conflicting or
contradictory.’” (quoting Bridgeman & Monk, supra note 24, at 3)).
27 See, e.g., Appell, supra note 26, at 736–37 (“[T]he contours and subjects of
childhood are contingent and regulatory, changing over time and space in response to
different policies, conditions, location, and demographics.”).
28 Ralph Linton, Age and Sex Categories, 7 AM. SOC. REV. 589, 595 (1942).
29 There is a growing literature on a more recently identified phase of the life
span in advanced capitalist countries, “emerging adulthood,” which includes the period
from the late teens through the twenties. See generally Jeffrey Jensen Arnett,
Emerging Adulthood: A Theory of Development from the Late Teens Through the
Twenties, 55 AM. PSYCH. 469 (2000). Scholars in this field have placed full-fledged
adulthood at “27 to 29 years-old.” Appell, supra note 26, at 735 n.119 (citing Jeffrey
Jensen Arnett, Emerging Adulthood(s), the Cultural Psychology of a New Life Stage, in
BRIDGING CULTURAL AND DEVELOPMENTAL APPROACHES TO PSYCHOLOGY 255–75 (Lene
Arnett Jensen ed., 2011)).
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often marked by a transition ritual.30 In many cultures, the first
marriage is the ritual marking the transition from childhood
or adolescence into adulthood.31 But this is not a universal
understanding of marriage, particularly in places where arranged
early marriages are the norm.32 For example, marriage does not
necessarily indicate that a child is developmentally “ready” for a
marital relationship; rather, it signifies a transfer of guardianship
from a female child’s parents to her husband’s family.33 In
some places, a female child is not considered an adult until she
has given birth to a child.34
Laws function as a written expression of the boundaries
of childhood. They define both the duties owed to children and
the rights recognized as belonging to them.35 The influence runs
in the other direction as well, when laws play an important role in
constructing and reinforcing dominant conceptions of childhood
in a given society.36 The vast majority of nations have set a
minimum legal age of marriage as a result of a decades-long
effort by the international human rights community to end child
marriage.37 In 1965, the United Nations General Assembly
adopted a resolution that recommended that all nations set a
minimum legal age of marriage to “not [ ] less than fifteen.”38 In
1979, that same body adopted the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women,
which required states parties to pass legislation specifying a
minimum age of marriage and to create an official marriage
registry.39 It also outlawed the betrothal and marriage of
“children,” without defining that term.40
In 1989, the United Nations General Assembly adopted
the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), which defines
“child” as a person under the age of eighteen.41 The Committee
on the Rights of the Child, which is responsible for monitoring
the implementation of the Convention, “strongly recommends
Linton, supra note 28, at 591.
Id. at 597.
32 Id. at 597–98.
33 Id. at 598.
34 Id. at 593.
35 Appell, supra note 26, at 740.
36 Allison James, et al., Care and Control in the Construction of Children’s
Citizenship, in CHILDREN AND CITIZENSHIP 85, 88 (Antonella Invernizzi & Jane
Williams eds., 2008).
37 See supra note 2 (describing international conventions intended to end
child marriage).
38 G.A. Res. 2018 (XX), Recommendation on Consent to Marriage, Minimum
Age for Marriage and Registration of Marriages (Nov. 1, 1965).
39 CEDAW, supra note 2, at Introduction, art. 16(2).
40 Id. (The term “children” is undefined in the CEDAW).
41 CRC, supra note 2, art. 1.
30
31
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that [s]tates parties” legislate a minimum age of marriage of
eighteen, “with and without parental consent.”42 However, in at
least forty countries, customary laws permitting marriage at
younger ages or with the consent of a child’s parent can override
the laws specifying a minimum age of marriage.43 In many
other countries, inconsistencies and exceptions within the law
permit the marriage of individuals under the legal minimum
age to continue.44 These inconsistencies and the continuing
prevalence of early marriage around the world suggest that
international instruments setting the minimum age of
marriage at eighteen function to set a normative, as opposed to
a legal, standard in many countries.
B.

The Treatment of Children Under U.S. Immigration Law

There is no uniformity or internal logic in the way that
U.S. immigration law defines and treats noncitizen children.
Scholars have noted that the terms “child,” “minor,” and “juvenile”
are scattered throughout the immigration laws, yet no uniform
definitions of the terms exist.45 The definition of “child” in the
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) is complex and differs
for purposes of (1) immigration and (2) naturalization and
citizenship. For both purposes, however, the definition of
“child” is restricted to persons under twenty-one years of age
who are unmarried.46 The reference to marital status in the
definition of “child” relates back to the idea that marriage, in
many cultures and in some aspects of U.S. domestic relations
law, signifies a break with childhood.47 By contrast, the statutory
definition of “unaccompanied alien child” refers to a person
under the age of eighteen and does not mention marital status.48
The term “minor,” when it appears in the statute or other
regulations, can mean a person under age twenty-one,
eighteen, or fourteen, depending on the context, and does not
42 Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, CRC/GC/2004/4, ¶ 16,
CRC General Comment No. 4: Adolescent Health and Development in the Context of
the Convention on the Rights of the Child (July 1, 2003).
43 Warner, supra note 10, at 244; see also Ruth Gaffney-Rhys, International
Law as an Instrument to Combat Child Marriage, 15 INT’L J. HUM. RTS. 359, 365 (2011)
(describing how the law in many African jurisdictions contravenes the instruments
adopted by the African Union that require the minimum age of marriage for men and
women to be eighteen years).
44 See Gaffney-Rhys, supra note 43, at 363–67.
45 See, e.g., David B. Thronson, Kids Will Be Kids? Reconsidering Conceptions
of Children’s Rights Underlying Immigration Law, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 979, 997–98 (2002).
46 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)–(c) (2012).
47 See Linton, supra note 28, at 597.
48 6 U.S.C. § 279(g)(2)(B) (2012).
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mention marital status.49 “Juvenile” is used to refer to persons
under age eighteen or twenty-one, without reference to marital
status.50 In immigration law, as in the rest of the law, the
concept of childhood is a construct that can differ across time
and space.
1. Children as Members of Nuclear Families
Family-based immigration accounts for the majority of
all legal permanent immigration to the United States.51 For
example, in fiscal year 2014, 63.5% of the 1,016,516 foreign
nationals admitted to the United States as lawful permanent
residents were admitted on the basis of family ties.52 Of those
family-based immigrants, 61,217 were categorized as children
of U.S. citizens under the INA.53 These numbers reflect that the
reunification of nuclear families is a major goal of U.S.
immigration policy.54 Accordingly, U.S. immigration laws have
49 See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(F)(ii) (2012) (referring to minor children of a student
visa holder, which is subject to the definition of child in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b), which is limited
to persons under twenty-one years of age); id. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(iii) (describing an exemption
applying to minors regarding unlawful presence as “time in which an alien is under 18 years
of age”); see also 8 C.F.R. § 103.8(c)(2)(ii) (2016) (describing special service requirements that
apply for “a minor under 14 years of age”).
50 See 22 U.S.C. § 7105(c)(4) (2012) (mandating training for certain agency
personnel in identifying “juvenile victims” of trafficking, who are presumably defined in
§ 7105(b)(1)(C)(ii)(I) as persons “who [have] not attained 18 years of age”); 8 C.F.R.
§ 236.3(a) (defining a juvenile as “an alien under the age of 18 years” in the context of
detention); id. § 204.11(c)(1) (describing eligibility for classification as a special
immigrant juvenile for aliens “under twenty-one years of age”). The William
Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No.
110-457, § 235(d)(6), 122 Stat. 5044, 5079 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1232(d)(6) (2012)),
clarified that persons twenty-one years of age and older may also be classified as
special immigrant juveniles, so long as they were under twenty-one at the time of
application. This reinforces that the status is intended for juvenile petitioners, while
providing age-out protection.
51 See WILLIAM A. KANDEL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43145, U.S. FAMILYBASED IMMIGRATION POLICY 4 (2016).
52 OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., ANNUAL
FLOW REPORT: U.S. LAWFUL PERMANENT RESIDENTS: 2014, at 3 (2016).
53 Id.
54 Congressional commissions on immigration policy have cited family
reunification as one of the primary goals of U.S. immigration policy. U.S. COMM’N ON
IMMIGRATION REFORM, BECOMING AN AMERICAN: IMMIGRATION AND IMMIGRANT POLICY
24 (1997) (stating that “a well-regulated [immigration] system . . . facilitates nuclear
family reunification”); id. at 67 (“Only if there is a compelling national interest—such
as nuclear family reunification or humanitarian admissions—should immigrants be
admitted without regard to the economic contributions they can make.”); SELECT
COMM’N ON IMMIGRATION & REFUGEE POLICY, U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY AND THE
NATIONAL INTEREST: STAFF REPORT OF THE SELECT COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION &
REFUGEE POLICY, at xix (1981) (“The Select Commission recommends that the
reunification of families continue to play a major and important role in U.S.
immigration policy.”). The other three major principles of U.S. immigration policy
embodied in the Immigration and Nationality Act are “admission of persons with
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generally been drafted to promote family reunification, with a
preference for members of a petitioner’s nuclear family.55 Family
relationships have served as a basis for admitting immigrants
since the 1920s.56 Congress has cited several reasons for
prioritizing family reunification in immigration policy including
tradition, the policy’s humanitarian character, the promotion of
public order and wellbeing, and psychological and social benefits
to immigrants.57
The INA established the structure of the family-based
immigration system in 1952.58 The system was built around a
hierarchy of family-based preferences that prioritizes spouses
and minor children of U.S. citizens over other relatives.59 In 1965,
the INA was amended and, among other changes, created the
classification of “immediate relatives,” which included the
spouses, unmarried children under age twenty-one, and parents
of adult citizens.60 Immediate relatives are admitted without
numerical restriction.61 By contrast, the number of visas available
in any given year for more distant relatives—“family-sponsored
immigrants”—is limited.62 These include the unmarried adult
sons and daughters, married sons and daughters, and adult
siblings of adult citizens.63 The lack of numerical restriction on
needed skills[,] . . . refugee protection[,] and . . . country-of-origin diversity.” KANDEL,
supra note 51, at 1.
55 KANDEL, supra note 51, at 1–2 (describing the evolution of U.S. familybased immigration policy from the 1920s through 2016, including the major
reformulations of immigration law in 1952 and 1965).
56 Emergency Quota Law, Pub. L. No. 67-5, § 2(a)(8), 4 Stat. 5, 5 (1921)
(exempting minor children of U.S. citizens from the first broad numerically limited
immigration restrictions).
57 See
SELECT COMM’N ON IMMIGRATION & REFUGEE POLICY, U.S.
IMMIGRATION POLICY AND THE NATIONAL INTEREST: STAFF REPORT OF THE SELECT
COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE POLICY 357 (Supp. 1981) (“The
reunification of families should remain one of the foremost goals of immigration not
only because it is a humane policy, but because bringing families back together
contributes to the economic and social welfare of the United States. Society benefits
from the reunification of immediate families, especially because family unity promotes
the stability, health and productivity of family members.”).
58 Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163.
59 Id. § 101(a)(27)(A), 66 Stat. at 169 (defining “nonquota immigrant” to
include “the child or the spouse of a citizen of the United States”); id. § 205(b)(2)–(4), 66
Stat. at 180 (describing allotment of visas to different categories of quota immigrants
including parents of U.S. citizens; spouses or children of lawful permanent residents;
and brothers, sisters, sons, or daughters of U.S. citizens).
60 An Act to Amend the Immigration and Nationality Act, § 201(b), Pub. L.
No. 89-236, 79 Stat. 911, 911 (1965).
61 Id. § 201(a), 79 Stat. at 911 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1151(a)–(b) (2012)).
62 8 U.S.C. § 1151(a) (2012).
63 Id. § 1153(a); see also Policy Memorandum from U.S. Citizenship &
Immigration Serv., New T Nonimmigrant Derivative Category and T and U
Nonimmigrant Adjustment of Status for Applicants from the Commonwealth of the
Northern Mariana Islands (Oct. 30, 2014), https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/
USCIS/Outreach/Interim%20Guidance%20for%20Comment/Interim_PM-602-0107.pdf
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the number of visas available for spouses and minor children
reflects the law’s intent to keep traditional nuclear families
unified. Another indication of this intent is the extension of
immigration status to the spouse and children of a familysponsored immigrant.64 For example, when a visa becomes
available to a family member of a U.S. citizen, the spouse
and children of that “principal alien” family member may also
immigrate, thus preserving the unity of that nuclear family.65
2. Designations and Statuses Specifically Intended to
Benefit Children
In the family immigration system, children are always
defined in relation to a parent.66 The definition of a “child” in
the INA is a person who is under twenty-one years of age,
unmarried, and who also fits within one of seven categories of
relationships with an adult.67 Broadly, these relationships include
a child born in wedlock, a stepchild, a legitimated child, a child
born out of wedlock who has a relationship with his or her
biological parent, an adopted child, an orphaned child of an adult
with the ability to file an immigration petition for family members,
or a child who is the subject of an international adoption.68
Therefore, in the INA sections relating to family-based
immigration, a “child” does not exist without reference to a parent
or parent surrogate. Outside of the family immigration context,
however, there exist several designations and statuses specifically
intended to benefit noncitizen children. This section describes
three examples of such classifications to illustrate the ways in
which the federal government conceives of immigrant children
outside of the nuclear family.
The first example is Special Immigrant Juvenile Status
(SIJS), an immigration classification created in 1990 with the
intention of protecting unaccompanied immigrant minors
present in the United States who were abused, neglected, or

[https://perma.cc/9QCW-P9YD] (explaining that the term “son or daughter” in immigration
law “is a term of art meaning a child who is married and/or over the age of 21”).
64 8 U.S.C. § 1153(d).
65 Id.; id. § 1153(a)(4) (describing the preference allocation for brothers and
sisters of citizens, whose spouses and children would, under § 1153(d), be entitled to
the same status and order of consideration); see 22 C.F.R. 40.1(q) (2012) (“Principal alien
means an alien from whom another alien derives a privilege or status under the law or
regulations.” (emphasis omitted)).
66 See Thronson, supra note 45, at 991.
67 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b).
68 Id.
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abandoned by a parent.69 An approved SIJS application allows
a person to immediately apply for lawful permanent resident
status.70 SIJS is a unique benefit under immigration law
because it requires applicants to obtain a state court order
containing specific findings prior to submitting an application
for the immigration status.71 Any state court that is authorized
under state law to make judicial determinations about the
custody and care of children may issue the order.72 The court
must make three findings: (1) that the applicant is dependent
on the court, or is in the custody of a state agency, a private
agency, or a private person; (2) that the applicant cannot be
reunited with one or both parents due to abuse, abandonment,
neglect, or a similar basis under state law; and (3) that it is not
in the applicant’s best interests to return to his or her home
country.73 In addition to obtaining the “special findings order”
from a state court, a successful applicant must be (1)
“physically present in the United States”; (2) “under 21 years
old at the time of filing”; and (3) “unmarried,” both at the time
of filing and when USCIS makes a decision on the application.74
The second example is the codification of the term
“unaccompanied alien child” (UAC), which first appeared in the
immigration laws with the passage of the Homeland Security Act
of 2002 (HSA).75 A UAC is defined as a child who
(A) has no lawful immigration status in the United States;
(B) has not attained 18 years of age; and
(C) with respect to whom—
(i) there is no parent or legal guardian in the United States; or

69 See Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 105-119, § 113, 111 Stat.
2440, 2460 (1997) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J)) (requiring findings of abuse,
neglect, or abandonment); see also The 2014 Humanitarian Crisis at Our Border: A
Review of the Government’s Response to Unaccompanied Minors One Year Later Before
the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs, 114th Cong. (2015)
(statement of Joseph E. Langlois, U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Serv.) (“SIJ
classification is an immigration protection for foreign-born, non-U.S. citizen or lawful
permanent resident children present in the United States who have been abused,
neglected, or abandoned by a parent.”); 143 CONG. REC. 26,585 (1997).
70 8 C.F.R. § 245.1 (2016).
71 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J)(ii).
72 8 C.F.R. § 204.11(a).
73 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J); see 8 C.F.R. § 204.11(c). Regulations implementing
amendments to the statutory definition of a Special Immigrant Juvenile in 2008 have
been proposed, but not yet adopted. Special Immigrant Juvenile Petitions, 76 Fed. Reg.
54,978 (proposed Sept. 6, 2011) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. § 204.11).
74 Special Immigrant Juvenile Petitions, 76 Fed. Reg. at 54,979‒80.
75 Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 462(g)(2), 116 Stat.
2135, 2205 (codified at 6 U.S.C. § 279(g)(2) (2012)).
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(ii) no parent or legal guardian in the United States is available
to provide care and physical custody.76

Children designated as UACs are not automatically
eligible for any immigration status but are eligible for special
treatment by the federal agencies responsible for their
apprehension, detention, treatment, release, and repatriation.77
This consists of expanded access to social services and special
programs while in immigration custody that are not generally
available to adults and accompanied children, including
facilitated access to pro bono legal counsel.78 Being designated a
UAC can dramatically improve a person’s experience in the U.S.
immigration system. Since there is no marital status requirement
in the definition of UAC, married minors are eligible for the
designation and the special treatment that flows from it.
The third example of an immigration status that is
designed to benefit children as individuals—as opposed to
children within a family—is the Deferred Action for Childhood
Arrivals (DACA) program, a discretionary, temporary protection
from deportation for certain people who were brought to the
United States as children.79 DACA does not confer any lawful
76 6 U.S.C. § 279(g)(2). The Secretary of Health and Human Services and the
Secretary of Homeland Security have developed procedures to determine the age of
aliens in their custody. See 8 U.S.C. § 1232(b)(4) (requiring the development of age
determination procedures for unaccompanied aliens); OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S.
DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., AGE DETERMINATION PRACTICES FOR UNACCOMPANIED
ALIEN CHILDREN IN ICE CUSTODY (2009), https://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/
OIG_10-12_Nov09.pdf [https://perma.cc/46RJ-DMYY]. But see id. at 7 (“We could not
identify a single, authoritative definition of what might constitute a holistic approach
to age determination. . . . ICE further stated that despite extensive research, it did not
find a standard or precise process or technique for conducting holistic age
determinations.”).
77 See 6 U.S.C. § 279 (describing the responsibilities of the Director of the
Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR) of the Department of Health and Human
Services (HHS) with respect to the care of UACs); 8 U.S.C. § 1232(a)(1) (requiring the
Secretary of Homeland Security to work in conjunction with the Secretary of State, the
Attorney General, and the Secretary of HHS to develop policies and procedures to
ensure that UACs are safely repatriated); Stipulated Settlement Agreement at 3,
Flores v. Reno, No. CV 85-4544-RJK(Px) (C.D. Cal. Jan. 17, 1997) (setting national
standards regarding the detention, release, and treatment of all children in federal
immigration custody).
78 8 U.S.C. § 1232(c)(5) (requiring HHS to “ensure, to the greatest extent
practicable . . . that all [UACs] who are or have been in the custody of the Secretary or
the Secretary of Homeland Security . . . have counsel to represent them. . . . To the
greatest extent practicable, the Secretary of [HHS] shall make every effort to utilize
the services of pro bono counsel who agree to provide representation to such children
without charge”); see also Stipulated Settlement Agreement, supra note 77, at 7
(requiring alien minors in federal custody to be treated with “special concern for their
particular vulnerability as minors”).
79 Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson, Sec’y of Homeland Sec., to León
Rodriguez et al., Dir., U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Serv. (Nov. 20, 2014),
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/14_1120_memo_deferred_action.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4STG-L873] (expanding certain parameters of DACA); Memorandum from
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immigration status on recipients; rather, it represents the
Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) decision to refrain
from initiating proceedings to deport the recipient for a
particular period.80 DACA recipients receive a renewable, twoyear deferral of removal and may apply for employment
authorization during that period.81 In order to be granted
DACA, applicants must prove that they: (1) were under the age
of thirty-one as of June 15, 2012; (2) came to the United States
before they turned sixteen years old; (3) have continuously
resided in the United States since June 15, 2007; (4) were
physically present in the United States on June 15, 2012;82 (5)
are currently in school, graduated from high school, obtained a
general education development certificate, or were honorably
discharged from the Coast Guard or Armed Forces; and (6)
have not been convicted of certain types of crimes.83
The existence of immigration statuses and designations
that are specifically intended to benefit children as individuals—
such as SIJS, the UAC designation, and DACA—indicate that
both Congress and the DHS have put considerable thought into
drawing distinctions between children and adults in the
immigration context. These distinctions are not uniform and are
based on conceptions of childhood and adulthood that were
considered appropriate for the particular time and context in
which the laws and policies were established. For example, the
significance of an applicant’s age, marital status, and relationship
with his or her parents differs across the three benefits—even
though all are designed to benefit noncitizen children outside of
the family-based immigration system. These differences reflect
the general incoherence of immigration law’s treatment of
children, which is discussed in detail in Part II.

Janet Napolitano, Sec’y of Homeland Sec., to David V. Aguilar et al., Acting Comm’r, U.S.
Customs & Border Prot. (June 15, 2012), https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/s1-exercisingprosecutorial-discretion-individuals-who-came-to-us-as-children.pdf [https://perma.cc/UY97KRKW] [hereinafter Napolitano Deferred Action Memo] (establishing the DACA program
by setting forth policy for DHS’s exercise of discretion in enforcing immigration laws against
young, undocumented immigrants).
80 See generally Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471,
483–84 (1999) (describing deferred action).
81 Napolitano Deferred Action Memo, supra note 79, at 2; see 8 C.F.R.
§ 247a.12(c)(14) (2016) (providing that deferred action recipients may apply for work
authorization if they can show an “economic necessity for employment”).
82 This is the date on which the Secretary of Homeland Security established
the DACA program in an agency memorandum. Napolitano Deferred Action Memo,
supra note 79.
83 Id. at 1.
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3. Recognition of Marriages Involving Minor Children
As the data discussed in the Introduction indicate, USCIS
regularly recognizes marriages involving minor children. This
section describes the general rules governing immigration
agencies’ recognition of foreign marriages for immigration
purposes and the curious absence of specific guidance on the
recognition of foreign marriages involving minor children. The
lack of clarity on this issue begs the question: What is the public
policy of the United States regarding child marriage?
Congress has given the immigration agencies broad
discretion to determine what constitutes a valid, bona fide
marriage for immigration purposes. The INA does not define
the terms “husband,” “wife,” or “spouse,” nor does it state what
constitutes a valid marriage.84 As a general rule, the DHS
considers a marriage valid for immigration purposes if it is
recognized as valid in the place of celebration.85 The place-ofcelebration rule originated in English choice-of-law principles
from the eighteenth century or earlier.86 It was adopted in the
United States, and governs the recognition of marriages
domestically across state lines as well.87 The Board of
Immigration Appeals (BIA)—the highest administrative body
for interpreting and applying U.S. immigration law—first
applied the place-of-celebration rule in 1952 when it analyzed
the legitimacy of a German marriage under German law.88 In
this decision, the BIA linked its adoption of the place-ofcelebration rule to the “plain congressional purpose in
84 The INA does, however, describe the terms “spouse,” “wife,” and “husband”
in the negative at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(35), describing proxy marriage, which is the only
categorically invalid type of marriage for immigration purposes. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(35)
(describing a marriage ceremony in which “the contracting parties thereto are not
physically present in the presence of each other, unless the marriage shall have been
consummated”).
85 U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., ADJUDICATOR’S FIELD MANUAL
§ 21.3(a)(2)(B) (2015), https://www.uscis.gov/ilink/docView/AFM/HTML/AFM/0-0-0-1/00-0-3481/0-0-0-4484.html#0-0-0-389 [https://perma.cc/9P2B-SNG5] [hereinafter USCIS,
ADJUDICATOR’S FIELD MANUAL] (“Validity of a Marriage Celebrated in a Foreign
Country. One may normally presume the validity of a marriage upon presentation of a
marriage certificate, duly certified by the custodian of the official record. As a general
rule, the validity of a marriage is judged by the law of the place of celebration.”).
86 Alan Reed, Essential Validity of Marriage: The Application of Interest
Analysis and Depecage to Anglo-American Choice of Law Rules, 20 N.Y. L. SCH. J. INT’L
& COMP. L. 387, 392–93 (2000).
87 The U.S. Supreme Court’s first statement of the place-of-celebration rule to
marriage occurred in Patterson v. Gaines, a case that centered on the validity of a
marriage that, it was claimed, involved bigamy. Bigamy rendered a marriage void
under the law of Pennsylvania, where the marriage was celebrated. Patterson v.
Gaines, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 550, 587 (1848) (“The marriage must be proved, according to
what would be proof of it where it took place.”).
88 In re P, 4 I. & N. Dec. 610 (B.I.A. 1952).
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providing preferential status for entry of immigrants closely
related to American citizens,” (i.e., family reunification).89
The BIA also adopted one of the common law exceptions
to the place-of-celebration rule for marriages that are deemed
contrary to the public policy of the United States. It first
applied this exception in 1962 in a case involving a polygamous
marriage that was valid where it was performed, in Jordan.90
The BIA found evidence of a strong federal public policy
against polygamy dating back to 1891—when polygamists were
added to the list of excludable aliens—and therefore concluded
that a polygamous marriage could not be recognized as valid
for immigration purposes.91 Incestuous marriages, which are
permissible in many U.S. states depending on the degree of
blood relationship between the parties, have been deemed
contrary to the public policy of the United States in some
instances, and recognized as valid for immigration purposes in
others.92 In general, the BIA has applied the public policy
exception to incestuous marriages in a limited manner, where
there is a possible risk of criminal prosecution in the state of
residence.93 Prior to the landmark U.S. Supreme Court decisions
of Loving v. Virginia in 196794 and United States v. Windsor in
2013,95 interracial and same-sex marriages, respectively, were

Id. at 614.
In re H, 9 I. & N. Dec. 640 (B.I.A. 1962); see also USCIS, ADJUDICATOR’S
FIELD MANUAL, supra note 85, § 21.3(a)(2)(B) (“[I]f a marriage is valid in the country
where celebrated but considered offensive to public policy of the United States, it will
not be recognized as valid for immigration purposes. Plural marriages fall within this
category.”).
91 In re H, 9 I. & N. Dec. at 642. The United States has consistently refused
to recognize the validity of polygamous marriages for immigration purposes. See, e.g.,
People v. Ezeonu, 588 N.Y.S. 2d 116, 117–18 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1992); In re Darwish, 14 I.
& N. Dec. 307 (B.I.A. 1973); In re G, 6 I. & N. Dec. 9 (B.I.A. 1953).
92 See, e.g., In re Zappia, 12 I. & N. Dec. 439 (B.I.A. 1967) (holding that a
marriage between first cousins that was validly contracted outside of the parties’ state
of domicile may be deemed invalid if it violates a strong public policy of the state of
domicile). In re Balodis, 17 I. & N. Dec. 428 (B.I.A. 1980) (holding that a marriage between
first cousins that was performed in Latvia is valid for immigration purposes, even
though the couple resides in Michigan, where such a marriage is void); But see In re Da
Silva, 15 I. & N. Dec. 778 (B.I.A. 1976) (holding that a marriage between an uncle and his
niece that was performed in Georgia is valid for immigration purposes, even though the
couple resides in New York, where such a marriage is void).
93 12 U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., POLICY MANUAL pt. G, ch.
2(A), n.4 (2016), https://www.uscis.gov/policymanual/HTML/PolicyManual-Volume12PartG-Chapter2.html [https://perma.cc/Y2CD-PE2C].
94 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (holding that a state law
restricting the freedom to marry solely on the basis of race violates both the Equal
Protection Clause and Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
95 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (rendering unconstitutional previous statutory
definitions of “marriage” as the legal union of one man and one woman, and the word
“spouse” as a person of the opposite sex who is a husband or a wife).
89
90
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also found to violate the public policy of the United States in the
immigration context.96
Marriage validity for immigration purposes has been
determined on a case-by-case basis, and the BIA has not
considered the issue of whether a marriage that was contracted
in a foreign country violates the public policy of the United
States because of the young age of one or both parties. It has,
however, recognized the validity of marriages involving minors
that were performed within the United States.97 The BIA has
even recognized marriages performed in the United States
when one of the parties was under the statutory presumptive
age of marital consent. For example, in In re Agoudemos, the
BIA recognized as valid the marriage of a female, fifteen-yearold U.S. citizen and a male, twenty-one-year-old Greek citizen,
even though the minimum age of marriage was sixteen—both
in the couple’s state of domicile and the state in which the
marriage was performed.98 The BIA based its decision on its
finding that under the laws of both states, a marriage entered
into by a person under the age of consent was voidable and not
void.99 Since neither party had taken any action to void the
marriage, it was considered a valid and bona fide marriage for
immigration purposes.100 The small number of BIA decisions on
the validity of marriages involving minors, coupled with the
available data on the significant number of minor immigrants
admitted to the United States as spouses, indicates that child
marriage has not been determined to be categorically offensive
to the public policy of the United States.
Indeed, there is limited guidance in the USCIS
Adjudicator’s Field Manual on how the ages of the parties to a
spousal petition should influence the analysis of marriage
validity. The only reference to age in the manual section on
96 See Adams v. Howerton, 673 F.2d 1036 (9th Cir. 1982) (creating a judicial
bar to the recognition of same-sex marriages for immigration purposes), abrogated by
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015); In re D, 3 I. & N. Dec. 480, 481–83 (B.I.A.
1949) (refusing to recognize a Canadian marriage between a white man and a woman
of African descent who were both residents of North Dakota, where such a marriage
would be void).
97 See, e.g., In re A, 13 I. & N. Dec. 824 (B.I.A. 1971) (recognizing as valid for
immigration purposes the marriage of a fourteen-year-old female Jordanian citizen,
performed in Michigan with her parents’ consent).
98 In re Agoudemos, 10 I. & N. Dec. 444 (B.I.A. 1964).
99 Id. at 446.
100 Id. at 446–47; see also In re G, 9 I. & N. Dec. 89 (B.I.A. 1960) (involving the
marriage of a sixteen-year-old female U.S. citizen and a nineteen-year-old male Greek
citizen in Illinois, where the minimum age of marriage was twenty-one for males and
eighteen for females); USCIS, ADJUDICATOR’S FIELD MANUAL, supra note 85,
§ 21.3(a)(2)(B) (“If the marriage is voidable but no court action to void the marriage has
taken place, it will be considered valid for immigration purposes.”).
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spousal petitions is in the context of determining the bona fides
of the marriage (i.e., detecting marital fraud). The manual
states that a “large disparity of age” between spouses may
indicate that a marriage was contracted solely for immigration
benefits, in which case it would not confer benefits under the
INA.101 The nature of this guidance supports the impression
that USCIS views the marriage of minors, whether in the
United States or abroad, in a value-neutral manner. In other
words, USCIS will not normally look beyond the law of the
place of celebration when determining the validity of marriages
involving minors. Given the significant variation in laws and
cultural norms about the minimum age of marriage worldwide,
the application of the place-of-celebration rule to marriages
involving minors only complicates immigration law’s treatment
of children.
C.

The Dependency Construct of Childhood

Underlying the varied definitions of “child” within U.S.
immigration law is a shared assumption that children are
dependent on adults. This dependency construct casts children as
dependent on others for basic needs, as well as for the
fundamental aspects of personhood, such as having opinions,
interests, values, and culture.102 Children’s views are only
expressed through their parents or caregivers. The concept is
closely related to the notion of “children as property.”103
Historically, children in Europe and North America were
considered to be the property of their parents—specifically, their
fathers.104 As such, they were not recognized as having rights
independent of their fathers.105 However, a shift occurred during
USCIS, ADJUDICATOR’S FIELD MANUAL, supra note 85, § 21.3(a)(2)(H).
M. Aryah Somers et al., Constructions of Childhood and Unaccompanied
Children in the Immigration System in the United States, 14 U.C. DAVIS J. JUV. L. &
POL’Y 311, 326–27 (2010) (“This construction tends to romanticize the child as
embodying a state of purity, a tabula rasa. . . . Through their dependency, children can
gain community, love and affection, belonging, language, culture, moral authority,
racial identity, class, and values. This needs-based view also means that children have
limited agency and depend upon adults to determine their objectives, make decisions
for them, and represent their interests.” (footnotes omitted)).
103 See Thronson, supra note 45, at 982 (“Notions of parental property rights
in children, though discredited, have persistent influence.”); Barbara Bennett
Woodhouse, “Who Owns the Child?”: Meyer and Pierce and the Child as Property, 33
WM. & MARY L. REV. 995, 1042 (1992) (“A property model asserts not that children are
property but that our culture makes assumptions about children deeply analogous to
those it adopts in thinking about property.”).
104 See,
e.g., Jonathan Todres, Independent Children and the Legal
Construction of Childhood, 23 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 261, 266–67 (2014).
105 Thronson, supra note 45, at 982.
101

102
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the nineteenth century, when children came to be viewed as
inherently vulnerable and in need of protection.106 Still,
children under the age of majority were considered to be
“subsumed within the family and largely out of the public
sphere of society,” and therefore not a discrete category of
people about whom to legislate.107 Children’s rights were designed
to promote their freedom as adults, not as children.108 These
assumptions have influenced and, to a certain degree, continue
to influence, how the law conceives of children.
U.S. immigration law is structured around the assumption
that the child’s natural place is within the family and that
children are, in a sense, appendages of their parents. This
assumption is reflected in the unlimited number of immigrant
visas available for individuals recognized as children under the
family-based immigration laws.109 There is no independent
sense of these children as people in their own right; they are merely
subparts of a family unit.110 The family-based immigration system
does not recognize children unless they are bound to a parent.111
Children’s perspectives have been invisible in the framing of most
U.S. immigration policy—an echo of the invisibility of children’s
interests that permeates the dependency construct.112 In this

106 See id. at 984 (“In a sense, parents were not viewed as property owners,
but as fiduciaries. For the benefit of the community as a whole, children were seen as
persons in need of protection and guidance as they moved toward adulthood. . . . During
this time, the ‘best interests of the child’ standard emerged as the prevailing legal
principle in determining the fate of children.”).
107 Todres, supra note 104, at 272.
108 Annette
Ruth Appell, The Pre-political Child of Child-Centered
Jurisprudence, 46 HOUS. L. REV. 703, 729 (2009).
109 See discussion supra Section I.B.1.
110 See Jacqueline Bhabha, The “Mere Fortuity of Birth”? Children, Mothers,
Borders, and the Meaning of Citizenship, in MIGRATIONS AND MOBILITIES: CITIZENSHIP,
BORDERS, AND GENDER 187, 193 (Seyla Benhabib & Judith Resnik eds., 2009)
(“[C]hildren, particularly young children, are often considered parcels that are easily
moveable across borders with their parents and without particular cost to the
children.”).
111 Thronson, supra note 45, at 992; see 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(1)(A)–(F) (2012)
(describing the six categories of relationships with parents included in the INA
definition of “child”).
112 However, undocumented youth played an important role in campaigning for
the DREAM Act, or the Development, Relief and Education for Alien Minors Act, introduced
in 2009, which ultimately became the DACA program. See generally WALTER J. NICHOLLS,
THE DREAMERS: HOW THE UNDOCUMENTED YOUTH MOVEMENT TRANSFORMED THE
IMMIGRANT RIGHTS DEBATE (2013). Since then, immigration debates have included
children’s voices more often and in more prominent venues, such as eleven-year-old Karla
Ortiz’s speech at the 2016 Democratic National Convention. See Janell Ross, How Karla
Ortiz, 11-Year-Old Daughter of Undocumented Immigrants, Made a Powerful Political Case,
WASH. POST (July 26, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2016/07/26/
how-karla-ortiz-11-year-old-daughter-of-undocumented-immigrants-made-a-powerfulpolitical-case/ [https://perma.cc/4N4H-C39V].
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construct, children’s rights, such as they are, derive from their
needs for protection and socialization.113
The primary reason why legislators have supported
laws prioritizing parent-child reunification is the assumption
that parents owe a “legal and fiduciary responsibility” to their
children.114 The findings of the bipartisan U.S. Commission on
Immigration Reform, which issued a 1997 report on the
legislative and political history of the family-based immigration
system that is still widely considered relevant,115 echo this
rationale: “[T]he national interest in the entry of nuclear
family members outweighs that of more extended family
members. . . . Whatever the cultural and economic values
attached to each family relationship . . . the far stronger
responsibilities to one’s spouse and minor children are well
established in the U.S.”116
Despite the emphasis on parent-child reunification in
immigration legal and political history, children under the age
of twenty-one have never been permitted to file immigrant visa
petitions for their parents in the U.S. family-based immigration

Appell, supra note 108, at 729.
How Comprehensive Immigration Reform Should Address the Needs of
Women and Families: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 12–
14 (2013) [hereinafter Hearings on Comprehensive Immigration Reform] (statement of
Susan F. Martin, Donald G. Herzberg Professor of International Migration,
Georgetown University, Washington, DC) (stating that the “legal and fiduciary
responsibility for spouses and minor children” justifies the priority given to these
categories of relatives). Dr. Martin is the former executive director of the Jordan
Commission, and her statement reviewed the Commission’s recommendations
regarding priorities for immigrant admissions, including its recommendation to
eliminate the admission categories for more distant relatives, such as adult children
and siblings. Id. at 12–13.
115 See, e.g., Hearings on Comprehensive Immigration Reform, supra note 114,
at 13 (statement of Professor Susan F. Martin) (discussing relevant findings and
recommendations of the Commission on Immigration Reform). The Commission’s
recommendations are decidedly on the conservative end of the immigration policy
spectrum, and conservative advocates for immigration reform often cite them. See, e.g.,
Nayla Rush, Recalling “The Americanization Ideal”: The Legacy of Barbara Jordan,
FED’N FOR AM. IMMIGRATION REFORM (Feb. 2014), http://www.fairus.org/issue/recallingthe-americanization-ideal-the-legacy-of-barbara-jordan [https://perma.cc/5Y34-XMYE];
DAVID NORTH, CTR. FOR IMMIGRATION STUDIES, BACKGROUNDER: A BLUEPRINT FOR
IMMIGRATION REFORM: REVISITING THE JORDAN COMMISSION REPORT (2013), http://
cis.org/sites/cis.org/files/north-jordan-commission.pdf [https://perma.cc/JY4S-XY4U].
116 U.S. COMM. ON IMMIGRATION REFORM, BECOMING AN AMERICAN: IMMIGRATION
AND IMMIGRANT POLICY 65 (1997) (emphasis added). The report recognized the importance
of close bonds with, and the practical assistance of, extended family members, but
relied on tradition and the responsibility of the petitioner to provide for his family as
justification for the prioritization of spouses and minor children. Id.; see also Martha
Fineman, Dominant Discourse, Professional Language, and Legal Change in Child
Custody Decisionmaking, 101 HARV. L. REV. 727, 737 (1988) (describing children as “a
form of social investment in which custody produced concomitant social duties on the
part of each parent, the performance of which the state could supervise”).
113

114
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system.117 A parent has the right to create immigration status
for a child, but the right does not flow in the other direction.118
This asymmetry in the rights between parents and children is
not uncommon in U.S. immigration law.119 An earlier federal
commission on immigration policy recommended against
creating an immigration status for the parents of U.S. citizen
children based on its view that “petitioning for relatives is a
decision to be reserved for adults.”120 It is difficult to speculate
about the commission’s rationale, but it likely had concerns
about children’s capacity to make immigration decisions and
their inability to financially support their family members in
the United States.
The dependency construct of childhood in the familybased immigration system recalls an earlier set of assumptions
that once applied to women. Under the doctrine of coverture,
which originated in domestic relations law, “the husband and
wife are one person in law” and the “legal existence of the
woman is suspended during the marriage.”121 This principle
was incorporated into federal citizenship law in the following
way: Foreign women who married U.S. citizen men automatically
became U.S. citizens, while U.S. citizen women who married
foreign men were stripped of their citizenship.122 The underlying
assumption was that only a husband, as head of the family,
could determine the political and cultural character of that
family. This former gender asymmetry in citizenship laws is
similar to a current asymmetry in family reunification rights
between parents and children: Children derive immigration
status from their parents but not vice versa.123

8 U.S.C. § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i) (2012).
David B. Thronson, Entering the Mainstream: Making Children Matter in
Immigration Law, 38 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 393, 403–04 (2010).
119 Id. at 404 (“Child asylees and refugees may not extend derivative status to
their parents, yet adult asylees and refugees may generate derivative status for their
spouses and children. Similarly, a child granted protection from removal pursuant to
the Convention Against Torture may not extend eligibility to a parent. A child who
obtains legal immigration status through a family petition from one parent or a
stepparent may not include the other parent as a derivative.” (footnotes omitted)).
120 STAFF REPORT OF THE SELECT COMMISSION, supra note 54, at 114. The
report also noted that some Commissioners “believe that this limitation [on children
petitioning for parents] discriminates against and causes extreme hardship for some
minor U.S. citizens who must choose between living with their parents outside the
United States or growing up without their parents in the United States.” Id. at 115.
121 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *442.
122 See Act of Feb. 10, 1855, ch. 71, § 2, 10 Stat. 604 (conferring U.S.
citizenship on a foreign woman upon marriage to a citizen); Act of Mar. 2, 1907, ch.
2534, § 3, 34 Stat. 1228, 1228–29 (stripping U.S. citizen women of their citizenship
upon marriage to a foreigner).
123 See discussion infra Section II.A.
117

118
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The invisibility of the woman’s perspective, like
children’s perspectives in the family-based immigration system
today, was “justified by assumptions about her dependence—
social, political, economic, and personal—on male relatives,
typically her father first and her husband second.”124 Her right
to immigrate and obtain citizenship depended entirely on her
male relative’s right to do so. The justification for the
asymmetrical rights in this case, and in the case of children
vis-à-vis their parents, is that a categorically dependent person
travels with or follows the person who supports her, but not the
reverse.125 The long-standing assumptions about women and
the nature of family life that informed gender asymmetries in
the immigration and nationality laws of an earlier era are now
understood as discriminatory and socially constructed.126
Children’s legal coverture and underlying assumptions about
the “natural” dependency of children, however, persist.
In the family immigration system, there is an
assumption that the marriage of a child affects her dependence
on her parents, regardless of the actual nature of that
relationship post-marriage.127 A child, once married, is no longer
recognized as a “child” of her parents for immigration purposes.128
There is no transition period between childhood and adulthood
when the transition is marked by marriage. The change is
abrupt, as in other legal contexts.129 Part II contains a detailed
discussion of how the logic of the family-based immigration
system’s dependency construct breaks down when applied to
married minor children.
II.

PROBLEMS WITH IMMIGRATION LAW’S TREATMENT OF
MARRIED MINOR CHILDREN

Several scholars have described the need for a coherent
framework for thinking about children’s rights in immigration
law.130 This part examines inconsistencies in the treatment of
Bhabha, supra note 110, at 199.
See id. at 194.
126 Id.; Appell, supra note 108, at 715 (“Feminist jurisprudence . . . has
delegitimized the legal incompetence and dependency of the female subject.”).
127 See Thronson, supra note 45, at 991–92.
128 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b), (c) (2012).
129 Appell, supra note 108, at 753 (“Once children become adults, they are the
liberal citizen: autonomous, independent, unattached, and self-sufficient. They are no
longer entitled to care and support, but are responsible for their own lot, their own
achievements, and their own resources. This is true even though children experience
their dependency in widely disparate conditions.”).
130 See, e.g., Bhabha, supra note 110, at 218–19; Laila L. Hlass, States and
Status: A Study of Geographical Disparities for Immigrant Youth, 46 COLUM. HUM.
124
125
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married minor children in common scenarios in the family-based
immigration system. It highlights the outdated assumptions about
dependency, marriage, and family that underlie immigration law’s
constructions of children and women. The inadequacy of these
assumptions is amplified when they are applied to situations
involving married minor children.
A.

Inconsistent and Unfair Treatment of Married Minor
Children

The structure of the family-based immigration system
permits U.S. citizens and permanent residents to petition for
immigrant visas for relatives who fall within certain discrete
and narrowly defined categories.131 In this system, the spouses,
children, and parents of citizens receive priority.132 Since the
definition of “child” in the INA is restricted to those who are
unmarried, a married person under the age of twenty-one is no
longer considered a child for most purposes in the family-based
immigration system.133 When children under the age of twentyone are married, it can affect their ability to reunite with certain
relatives—sometimes for better, but often for worse.134 The
current, seemingly haphazard treatment of married minors under
U.S. immigration law is a signal that outdated assumptions about
dependency, marriage, and the family continue to influence the
law’s constructions of children.135 It also indicates that lawmakers
have not seriously considered the situation of married minor
children, a potentially vulnerable population within the familybased immigration system.
This section describes two common scenarios in the
family-based immigration system that demonstrate how
RTS. L. REV. 266 (2014); Elizabeth Keyes, Evolving Contours of Immigration
Federalism: The Case of Migrant Children, 19 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 33 (2016)
(describing how the complexity of the law governing Special Immigrant Juvenile Status
frustrates its purpose of protecting vulnerable children); Somers et al., supra note 102,
at 322–25; Thronson, supra note 118, at 395 (“[T]he examination of the treatment of
children in immigration law serves not only as a critique of current law, but also as a
template for simple, yet fundamental reforms that would bring U.S. immigration law
closer to mainstream values and approaches regarding children.”); Todres, supra note
104, at 264 (“[D]eveloping a more comprehensive construct of childhood is a critical
first step toward producing law and policy that is more responsive to the range of
realities facing all children, including independent children.”).
131 See supra Section I.B.
132 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i) (2012).
133 Id. § 1101(b)(1). The term “unmarried” means “an individual who at such
time is not married, whether or not previously married.” Id. § 1101(a)(39).
134 See Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 797–98 (1977) (recognizing that the INA’s
definition of a child may hinder the reunification of families in the United States but
concluding that this is a policy judgment entrusted to Congress).
135 See supra Section I.C.
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married minor children are not treated as either full children
or full adults and are, therefore, disadvantaged relative to both
groups. In the first example, married minor children can
petition for their spouses of any age but they cannot petition
for their parents and siblings until they are age twenty-one.136
In the second, married minor children receive a lower priority
as beneficiaries of parent-sponsored visa petitions than both
unmarried minor children and unmarried adult sons and
daughters. Minority trumps marital status when nonage
prevents a married minor from reunifying with her parents
and siblings by bringing them to the United States, while
marital status trumps minority when marriage prevents a
minor from reuniting with her parents by joining them in the
United States. The result is that the law disadvantages the
married minor children of U.S. citizens and permanent
residents in relation to unmarried minor children by excluding
them from eligibility for a benefit that they could have
otherwise received by virtue of their age; and in relation to
adult children—whether married or unmarried—by excluding
them from eligibility for a benefit that other individuals receive
by virtue of their presumed independence.
1. Inability to Petition for Parents or Siblings
The INA simultaneously treats married minor citizen
children as adults in relation to their spouses, but as children
in relation to their status as petitioners for their parents and
siblings.137 This suggests that Congress has either failed to
seriously consider how marital status should affect a married
minor’s right to petition for close relatives, or that it has relied
on stereotypes of dependent children and women, or both.
U.S. citizens and lawful permanent residents may file
petitions for immigrant visas for their spouses.138 A noncitizen
spouse of a U.S. citizen is categorized as an immediate relative
of the citizen,139 and a noncitizen spouse of a lawful permanent
resident is categorized as a Second Preference immigrant.140
136 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i) (defining “immediate relatives” of U.S. citizens
to include parents but only when a citizen is at least twenty-one years of age).
137 This section does not discuss family visa petitions for the children of U.S.
citizens and lawful permanent residents because neither marital status nor age affect
the petitioner’s right to file such petitions.
138 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)(A)(i), (a)(1)(B)(i)(I).
139 Id. § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i).
140 Id.
§ 1151(c) (calculation of worldwide level of family-sponsored
immigrants); id. § 1153(a)(2)(A); see KANDEL, supra note 51, at 4 (noting that in the
calculation of the number of family preference immigrants, “[u]nused visas in each
category roll down to the next preference category”); id. at 4 tbl.1 (indicating the order

2017]

THEORIZING THE IMMIGRANT CHILD

1627

Congress has consistently given the immigration agencies
broad discretion to draw the boundaries of what should be
considered a valid marriage for immigration purposes without
setting any age limits on who might be considered a “husband,”
“wife,” or “spouse.”141 Legally, there is nothing preventing a
married minor from successfully petitioning for his or her
spouse. Indeed, marriages involving one or more minor spouses
are regularly recognized as valid.142 Married minor children can
immigrate to the United States in the status of “spouse,” as
well as file petitions for their noncitizen spouses.143 In this
context, immigration law affords married minor children the
same benefits as married adults.
Separate from the issue of who may enter into a valid
marriage for immigration purposes, Congress decided that U.S.
citizens who are under the age of twenty-one cannot file
immigrant visa petitions for their parents and siblings.144
Therefore, married minor citizen children must wait until they
are twenty-one years old to petition for their parents and
siblings, just as unmarried minor children must do.145 In this
context, they are not treated as full adults.146 Their marital
of preference for family preference immigrants, which parallels the preference
allocations listed in § 1153(a)).
141 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i) (defining “immediate relatives” to include the
spouse of a U.S. citizen and not including a minimum age requirement for the
petitioner); id. § 1153(a)(2)(A) (including the spouse of an alien lawfully admitted for
permanent residence in the Second Preference category and not including a minimum
age requirement for the petitioner). See supra Section I.B.3 for a discussion of the rules
governing marriage validity for immigration purposes.
142 If there is a large difference in age between the spouses, however, the
marriage may be subject to increased scrutiny. See USCIS, ADJUDICATOR’S FIELD
MANUAL, supra note 85, § 21.2(b)(1)(B) (“A large difference in age between the
petitioner and beneficiary on a spouse petition is often the first indication you will have
that the marriage may have been contracted solely for the purpose of gaining an
immigration benefit (with or without the knowledge and complicity of the petitioner).”).
143 This is a common situation. For example, 15,971 minors (under the age of
eighteen) became lawful permanent residents based on visa petitions filed by their U.S.
citizen spouses since 1973. Office of Immigration Statistics, supra note 21. See
discussion supra Part I.B.3 citing BIA cases in which married minor U.S. citizens
successfully filed visa petitions for their spouses. See In re Agoudemos, 10 I. & N. Dec.
444 (B.I.A. 1964); In re G, 9 I. & N. Dec. 89 (B.I.A. 1960).
144 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i) (including parents of U.S. citizens in the
category of immediate relatives, “except that, in the case of parents, such citizens shall
be at least 21 years of age”); id. § 1153(a)(4) (“Qualified immigrants who are the
brothers or sisters of citizens of the United States, if such citizens are at least 21 years
of age, shall be allocated visas . . . .”).
145 Eligibility to petition for these relatives is strictly monitored. See, e.g.,
USCIS, ADJUDICATOR’S FIELD MANUAL, supra note 85, § 21.2(b)(1)(B) (“[A] petition
filed to accord immediate relative classification to a parent or fourth preference
classification to a brother or sister requires a review of the petitioner’s date of birth
because the petitioner must be at least 21 years of age at the time of filing.”).
146 “Adult” is not defined in the family-based immigration system. 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101 (listing definitions used in Chapter 12, “Immigration and Nationality,” of Title
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status—which enabled them to file or benefit from a spousal
petition, just as an adult could—does not enable them to file
petitions for their parents or siblings, as an adult could. They
are treated indistinguishably from unmarried minors. In other
words, minority trumps marital status when non-age prevents
a married minor from petitioning for her premarital,
nondescendant kin.
2. Obstacles to Benefitting from Parent-Sponsored
Petitions
Married minor children of U.S. citizens face obstacles to
benefitting from parent-sponsored petitions that do not affect
unmarried children of the same age. An unmarried child of a
naturalized U.S. citizen who is under twenty-one years of age is
able to immigrate to the United States immediately after his or
her visa petition is approved, while the married minor child of
a U.S. citizen can wait decades for the same benefit.147 This is
because individuals who fit the former description are
considered “immediate relatives” of the citizen,148 a category for
which there is an unlimited number of visas allocated in any
fiscal year.149 Married sons and daughters of U.S. citizens, on
the other hand, are not considered immediate relatives of the
citizen; they are “family preference immigrants,” subject to an
annual numerical limitation150 and further subcategorized into
four preference types based on the immigration status of the
petitioner, their relationship to the petitioner, and their marital
status.151 Married sons and daughters—regardless of age—of U.S.
citizens fall within the Third Preference classification,152 while
8, “Aliens and Nationality,” of the U.S. Code). However, the Department of Homeland
Security does refer to U.S. citizens who are at least twenty-one years old as “adult U.S.
citizens” in official reports. See, e.g., OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF
HOMELAND SEC., 2014 YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS 21 tbl.7 (2016)
(describing the IR5 immigrant class of admission as “[p]arents of adult U.S. citizens,
new arrivals”). Under 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i), U.S. citizen petitioners in this
category “shall be at least 21 years of age.”
147 See, e.g., Immigrant Numbers for September 2016, VISA BULL., Aug. 8, 2016,
at 2, https://travel.state.gov/content/dam/visas/Bulletins/visabulletin_September2016.pdf
[https://perma.cc/M6KS-FED7] (indicating that individuals from the Philippines and
Mexico seeking F3 visas have been waiting for twenty-two years for their visas).
148 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i) (defining “immediate relatives”).
149 Id. § 1151(b).
150 Id. § 1151(a)(1) (describing the annual limit on the number of familysponsored immigrants); id. § 1151(c) (describing the process for calculating the annual
level of family-sponsored immigrants). In fiscal year 2016, the number of visas
available to family preference immigrants was 226,000. Immigrant Numbers for
September 2016, supra note 147, at 1.
151 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a).
152 Id. § 1153(a)(3).
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unmarried adult sons and daughters have a higher priority
classification of First Preference.153
Every year there are many more qualified family
preference immigrant applicants than there are available
visas. This has caused an enormous backlog of approved family
preference immigrant visa petitions.154 There are also percountry caps for family preference immigrants, which means
that natives of countries with the largest numbers of emigrants
to the United States since the current immigrant selection
system went into effect on October 1, 1991,155 can wait decades
before they are permitted to immigrate.156 If the minor,
unmarried child of a U.S. citizen gets married after a petition
has been approved but before he or she is granted LPR status,
the approval of the petition is automatically revoked, the
immediate relative petition is converted to a Third Preference
petition, and the child will then be subject to a decades-long
wait.157 Between 1973 and 2014, at least 126 married minor
noncitizens obtained LPR status based on their relationship
with their U.S. citizen parents.158 If they had not been married,
they could have immigrated as immediate relatives.
The married minor children of permanent residents are
even worse off than the married minor children of U.S. citizens,
as they do not fall into any category of relatives who their
parents may sponsor. Their marital status effectively bars
them from immigrating through a parent-sponsored petition,
unless and until their parent becomes a U.S. citizen. Compared
to U.S. citizens, permanent residents have limited rights to file
visa petitions for relatives. Permanent residents may petition
for only two categories of relatives: (1) their spouses and
Id. § 1153(a)(1).
See, e.g., Visa Bulletin: Immigrant Numbers for September 2016, supra note
147, at 1–2 (indicating that every family preference category is currently oversubscribed,
i.e., there are many more approved petitions compared to available visas).
155 Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 161, 104 Stat. 4978, 5008
(codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1101 notes) (stating that amendments take effect on October 1,
1991, unless otherwise noted).
156 For example, in September 2016, the married Mexican sons or daughters of
U.S. citizens whose approved petitions were filed before November 15, 1994, were
finally permitted to apply for lawful permanent residence (LPR) status. Every person
in that category who applied for a visa on or after November 15, 1994, is still waiting to
immigrate. Immigrant Numbers for September 2016, supra note 147, at 2.
157 8 C.F.R. § 205.1(a)(3)(i)(G) (2010) (describing automatic revocation of
approved petition); U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL, at 9 FAM 502.23(D)(a) (2015) (describing automatic conversion of immediate relative petition to a
Third Preference petition if a child marries). Similarly, when adult sons and daughters
of U.S. citizens (First Preference) marry before they are granted LPR status, their
petitions are reclassified as Third Preference. Id. at 9 FAM 502.2-3(D)(b); 8 C.F.R.
§ 205.1(a)(3)(i)(H).
158 Office of Immigration Statistics, supra note 21.
153

154
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children and (2) their unmarried sons and daughters who are
at least twenty-one years old.159 Both categories are considered
family preference immigrants who fall within the Second
Preference classification, but are typically referred to as 2(A)
and 2(B) respectively.160 The wait for a visa is much longer for
2(B) beneficiaries than for 2(A) beneficiaries.161 The married
minor children of permanent residents do not fit within either
category. The 2(A) category includes a permanent resident’s
“children,” which is a term that is defined in the INA to mean
unmarried persons under twenty-one years of age.162 The 2(B)
category is, likewise, restricted to unmarried sons and
daughters, but those who are twenty-one years of age or older.
Therefore, the law permits permanent residents to reunite with
their unmarried sons and daughters of any age, but precludes
them from reuniting with their married sons and daughters of
any age. In this situation, as in other areas of immigration law, a
child’s marital status trumps minority to his or her detriment.
The logic, assumptions, and statutory language of the
family-based immigration system also apply to other types of
immigration benefits. One example of this is the family relative
petition process for recipients of asylum and for refugees.
Asylum is an immigration benefit available to noncitizens who
are already in the United States and who meet the definition of
a refugee.163 A refugee is a person who has fled his or her
country of nationality because of persecution or a well-founded
fear of persecution on account of “race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.”164 A
grant of asylum or refugee status permits an individual to stay
in the United States indefinitely, apply for LPR status, and,
eventually, become a U.S. citizen.165 The spouses and children
of asylum recipients and refugees are entitled to immigrate to
the United States in the same status as their family member,
even if they would not independently qualify for asylum or
See 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(2) (2012).
See, e.g., KANDEL, supra note 51, at 3.
161 Id. at 18; see Immigrant Numbers for September 2016, supra note 147, at 2
(indicating, for example, that visas are available for Mexican spouses and children of
permanent residents whose petitions were filed before September 1, 2014; and for
unmarried Mexican adult sons and daughters of permanent residents whose petitions
were filed before September 15, 1995).
162 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b).
163 Id. § 1158(a)(1), (b)(1)(B)(i).
164 Id.; see id. § 1101(a)(42)(A).
165 Id. § 1157 (describing the admission of refugees as immigrants); id. § 1158(c)(1)
(stating that the attorney general shall not remove an alien granted asylum from the United
States); id. § 1159 (describing adjustment of status procedure for refugees and aliens
granted asylum); id. § 1427 (describing requirements of naturalization).
159
160

2017]

THEORIZING THE IMMIGRANT CHILD

1631

refugee status.166 “Child” is defined with reference to the same
INA provision that is used in the context of family-based
immigration, which means it is restricted to individuals who are
under the age of twenty-one and unmarried.167 Therefore, the
married minor child of an asylum recipient or refugee would
not qualify for any immigration benefit through her parent for
a minimum of five years, when the parent would be eligible to
become a U.S. citizen.
The impact that these differences in classification can
have for married minors is best illustrated through a pair of
examples involving a hypothetical family. In 1994, a Filipina
mother becomes a U.S. citizen. She has three children living in
the Philippines: an unmarried twenty-five-year-old son; a
married sixteen-year-old daughter; and an unmarried fifteenyear-old daughter. She files visa petitions for all three children
on June 15, 1994. The fifteen-year-old daughter is considered a
child under the immigration law, and is therefore eligible to
immigrate immediately after her visa petition is approved,
within months. The sixteen-year-old daughter is classified as a
Third Preference family immigrant. The twenty-five-year-old
son is classified as a First Preference family immigrant. In May
2010, after a sixteen-year wait, a visa becomes available for the
now forty-one-year-old son.168 In October 2016, after a twentytwo-year wait, a visa becomes available for the now thirty-sevenyear-old daughter.169 Overall, the married minor daughter waited
twenty-two years longer than her unmarried sister and six years
longer than her unmarried brother to reunite with their
mother. If the mother in this hypothetical was a permanent

Id. § 1157(c)(2) (refugees); id. § 1158(b)(3)(1) (asylum recipients).
Id. §§ 1157(c)(2), 1158(b)(3)(1) (referring to id. § 1101(b)(1)(A)–(E)).
168 The wait times in the hypothetical are the actual—not estimated—amount of
time that a person in each situation would have waited for a visa. See Immigrant Numbers
for May 2010, VISA BULL., Apr. 9, 2010, at 2, https://travel.state.gov/content/visas/en/lawand-policy/bulletin/2010/visa-bulletin-for-may-2010.html [https://perma.cc/BMM3-NMW3]
(indicating that visas became available for unmarried Filipino sons and daughters of U.S.
citizens whose petitions were filed before November 1, 1994). The previous month, visas
were available only for individuals in the same category whose petitions were filed before
March 1, 1994. See Immigrant Numbers for April 2010, VISA BULL., Mar. 9, 2010, at 2,
https://travel.state.gov/content/visas/en/law-and-policy/bulletin/2010/visa-bulletin-for-april2010.html [https://perma.cc/G2LL-4LHE]. This hypothetical assumes that the son remained
unmarried all those years.
169 See Immigrant Numbers for October 2016, VISA BULL., Sept. 8, 2016, at 2,
https://travel.state.gov/content/dam/visas/Bulletins/visabulletin_October2016.pdf
[https://
perma.cc/K4XH-4UQC] (indicating that visas became available for married Filipino sons
and daughters of U.S. citizens whose petitions were filed before July 8, 1994). The
previous month, visas were available only for individuals in the same category whose
petitions were filed before June 15, 1994. See Immigrant Numbers for September 2016,
supra note 147, at 2.
166

167

1632

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 82:4

resident who never naturalized,170 the married sixteen-year-old
would not be eligible to immigrate at all; and the unmarried
daughter and son would have been eligible to immigrate in
January 1999 and March 2003, respectively.171
This hypothetical illustrates several problems with the
family-based immigration system including the extremely long
wait times for visas to become available in general; the
disincentives to marry that U.S. immigration law creates for
the adult children of U.S. citizens and permanent residents;
and the fact that the unmarried adult sons and daughters of
permanent residents can be eligible to immigrate sooner than
the unmarried adult sons and daughters of U.S. citizens.
However, its main purpose here is to illustrate the relative
disadvantage of a married minor child of a U.S. citizen
compared with unmarried minor and adult children.
B.

Interpreting the Treatment of Married Minor Children
in the Family-Based Immigration System

The inability of U.S. citizen children to generate
immigration status for their parents has been criticized as a
form of age discrimination.172 This limitation aligns with the
dependency construct of childhood, conceiving of children as
“passive objects” in contrast with their parents as “active rights
holders.”173 Age is used as a proxy for dependency, and it is
assumed that children derive their immigration status from
their parents.174
170 There are many reasons why a permanent resident who is eligible to
naturalize might not do so. For example, a 2012 survey by the Pew Hispanic Center found
that personal barriers—such as limited English proficiency, difficulty of the citizenship
test, and cost of the naturalization application—were the main reasons why nearly half of
Latino permanent residents had not yet naturalized. PEW HISPANIC CTR., AN AWAKENED
GIANT: THE HISPANIC ELECTORATE IS LIKELY TO DOUBLE BY 2030, at 21 & fig.13 (2012),
http://www.pewhispanic.org/files/2012/11/hispanic_vote_likely_to_double_by_2030_11-1412.pdf [https://perma.cc/33XM-8EK2].
171 U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, PHILIPPINES FAMILY PREFERENCE FINAL ACTION DATES
FROM FY1992–2015, https://travel.state.gov/content/dam/visas/family-preference-cut-offdates/Cut-off_Dates_Philippines_online.pdf [https://perma.cc/FD85-V6GG] (indicating a
cut-off date of June 15, 1994, for F2A visa petitions for Filipino citizens,
announced in the January 1999 Visa Bulletin); Immigrant Numbers for March 2003,
VISA BULL., Feb. 10, 2003, at 2, https://travel.state.gov/content/visas/en/law-andpolicy/bulletin/2003/visa-bulletin-for-march-2003.html
[https://perma.cc/M8BY-FXUD]
(indicating a cut-off date of July 1, 1994, for F2B visa petitions for Filipino citizens).
172 See, e.g., Bhabha, supra note 110, at 190 (“No other group of citizens in the
developed world today has such legally sanctioned partial access to the benefits of
membership. In other societies, and during other historical periods . . . the same has
been true of women. . . . Age-based discrimination, by contrast, is universal and
unquestioned.”).
173 Thronson, supra note 45, at 994.
174 Bhabha, supra note 110, at 194.
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As applied to married minor children, however, the
limitation on petitioning for parents and siblings seems
particularly unfair. Minor children can both petition for and
benefit from spousal visa petitions.175 As a result of the
marriage, they are no longer considered “children” who are
eligible to benefit from parent-sponsored petitions. Marriage is
considered a proxy for adulthood in the family-based immigration
system; having recognized a minor as sufficiently mature to enter
into marriage, it is unfair to treat her as a child for the purpose
of exercising a right to reunite with close family members.
The broad, age-based exclusion from the right to
petition for close family members is inconsistent with the
immigration system’s approach of treating marriage as a proxy
for adulthood. It is likely that Congress did not realize or give
serious consideration to how these laws would apply to married
minor children. Immigrants who fall into this category are
virtually invisible in immigration statistics because they would
be included in categories traditionally dominated by adults,
such as “spouse.”176 However, given the centrality of marital
relationships in the family-based immigration system, it is
important for the law to have a coherent approach to
distinguishing between children and adults and the rights that
come with membership in each of those categories.
Immigration laws that delay or prevent reunification
between U.S. citizen or permanent resident parents and their
married minor children living abroad are based on the
assumption that marriage alters the dependency relationship
between parents and children, regardless of the actual nature
of that relationship.177 Marriage signifies a break with
dependency on one’s parents, and therefore, with childhood.
The transition from childhood to adulthood is non-existent. A
child, once married, is no longer recognized as a “child” who is
eligible to immigrate with or follow a parent.178 In the familybased immigration system, a married minor child moves from a
dependent childhood to a form of adulthood that lacks some of
its key attributes—including the right to file immigrant visa
petitions for parents and siblings.

175 Note that Congress could have included a minimum age requirement for
petitioners or beneficiaries of spousal visa petitions, but did not.
176 See, e.g., Office of Immigration Statistics, supra note 21 (indicating that
approximately 20,000 immigrants under the age of eighteen obtained LPR status based
on their relationship with a spouse).
177 See Thronson, supra note 45, at 991.
178 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b), (c) (2012).
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The treatment of married minor children, the vast
majority of whom are girls, recalls both the concept of “children
as property” and the treatment of women in an earlier era.179
Married minor children are passed from the possession and
control of their parents, to the possession and control of their
spouses. Take the example, common in many cultures, in which
parents arrange an early marriage of their daughter. The
dependency construct assumes that parents have the liberty to
make marriage decisions for their children, even if such
decisions restrict their children’s opportunities to immigrate to
the United States. Decisions relating to marriage are relegated
to the private family and, therefore, release the state from any
obligation to consult with the married minor child about her
desire to enter and remain in the marriage.180
The criteria defining the preference categories for
family-based immigrants reinforce the significance of marital
status, as opposed to age, as a proxy for adulthood and
independence. For example, married minor children are
actually in a lower preference classification than the unmarried
adult sons and daughters of U.S. citizens.181 The reports of
Congressional commissions on immigration policy provide a
window into the minds of legislators who have the ability to
change which family members are prioritized for family
reunification, even if their recommendations are not followed.182
For example, in 1981, the Select Commission on Immigration
and Refugee Policy recommended that Congress move the
unmarried adult sons and daughters of U.S. citizens from the
First Preference classification to the immediate relative
category, based on its position that there should be no agebased distinctions among children to the right to quickly and
easily reunite with their parents and that this change would
not significantly increase the number of immediate relative
immigrants.183 Distinctions based on marital status, on the
other hand, have not been similarly criticized as “artificial.”
See discussion supra Section I.C.
See Appell, supra note 26, at 729; Bhabha, supra note 110, at 200 (“The
parallels [between gender and] age discrimination are dramatic. Because the child is absent
from the political and legislative process, his or her interests are unvoiced.”).
181 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(1), (a)(3).
182 See, e.g., STAFF REPORT OF THE SELECT COMMISSION, supra note 54, at 115
(recommending that Congress add grandparents of adult U.S. citizens to the immediate
relative category because “[g]randparents in many cultures are among the closest
relatives who, as a result of family movements, may be left alone in their homelands
during their later years”).
183 Id. at 114 (“[B]ecause [the Commission] believes that there should not be
an artificial distinction based on the age of unmarried sons and daughters of U.S.
citizens, it recommends moving the current first preference—the adult unmarried sons
179

180
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There are several additional features of the familybased immigration system that support the observation that
being characterized as a child has more to do with one’s
perceived dependency status than one’s level of development.
First, the requisite “unmarried” status of childhood does not mean
“never married.” As defined by statute, “unmarried” means “an
individual who at such time [that a petition is filed] is not
married, whether or not previously married.”184 A previously
married person who has been divorced or widowed and is under
the age of twenty-one is still considered a child in the familybased immigration system.185 Just as the minor children and
adult sons and daughters of U.S. citizens can be reclassified to
a less-favorable family preference classification if they marry,
they may also move in the other direction—to more favorable
classifications—if they obtain a divorce.186 The same is true for
the minor children and adult sons and daughters of lawful
permanent residents, who, but for their marital status, would
be eligible to immigrate in the Second Preference classification.
However, as with marriages, divorces must be in good faith and
not obtained solely to qualify for immigration benefits.187
It is only in this context that the USCIS Adjudicator’s
Field Manual urges officers to closely examine the claimed
marital status of a child beneficiary. The manual instructs
officers to carefully scrutinize a beneficiary who is “abnormally
old to be an unmarried person in a particular country.”188 By
and daughters of U.S. citizens—to the numerically unlimited family reunification
subcategory. The expansion of this numerically exempt subcategory to include all
unmarried sons and daughters of U.S. citizens will not result in significant increases in
immigration.”).
184 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(39).
185 USCIS, ADJUDICATOR’S FIELD MANUAL, supra note 85, § 21.2(b)(1)(B) (“A son
or daughter who is unmarried and under age 21 is a child. Unmarried does not mean
‘never married’ and a previously married son or daughter under age 21 is a ‘child.’”).
186 See 8 U.S.C. § 1151(f)(3) (stating that the age of an alien on the date of
termination of a marriage shall be used to determine if a petition originally filed for a
married son or daughter of a U.S. citizen should be converted to an immediate relative
petition or a First Preference classification—i.e., for an unmarried adult son or
daughter).
187 See, e.g., Bazzi v. Holder, 746 F.3d 640, 646 (6th Cir. 2013) (describing
“sham divorce” as a potential basis upon which to deny immigration benefits); In re
Aldecoaotolora, 18 I. & N. Dec. 430 (B.I.A. 1983) (denying a visa where the beneficiary
admitted that she divorced solely to obtain immigration benefits as the unmarried
daughter of lawful permanent residents); see also USCIS, ADJUDICATOR’S FIELD
MANUAL, supra note 85, § 21.2(b)(1)(B) (The ability of a previously married son or
daughter under age twenty-one to be characterized as a child “raises the distinct
possibility that someone might engage in divorce fraud in order to qualify for an
immigration benefit. As we do not recognize a marriage which is contracted solely to
circumvent immigration law, we also do not recognize a divorce which is obtained
solely to circumvent immigration law.”).
188 USCIS, ADJUDICATOR’S FIELD MANUAL, supra note 85, § 21.2(b)(1)(B).
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doing so, USCIS explicitly recognizes that in many cultures,
marriages routinely occur at ages that would be considered
“fairly young” in the United States.189 It uses this knowledge to
screen for fraud among beneficiaries who are claimed as children
of U.S. citizens or permanent residents, or unmarried adult sons
and daughters of U.S. citizens, but who actually have undeclared
marriages.190 The nature of this guidance further supports the
impression, discussed above, that in the family-based
immigration system, USCIS is only concerned with the marital
status of minors for the purpose of fraud detection.191
The ability to revert to the status of “child” after being
divorced or widowed makes it clear that the law’s conception of
childhood has nothing to do with physical, emotional, or
cognitive development. Rather, in the family-based immigration
system, perceived dependency status delineates childhood from
adulthood. Moreover, the ability of adult sons and daughters of
U.S. citizens to obtain more favorable immigration benefits after
being divorced or widowed signifies the centrality of dependency
relationships to the definition of the family unit. Indeed, the
Board of Immigration Appeals has recognized that Congress’s
intent in creating the First Preference classification was “based
upon the belief that such unmarried children, although not
minors, still belonged to the family unit.”192
Second, the family-based immigration system protects
the children of U.S. citizens from “aging out” of eligibility for a
visa but does not protect them from “marrying out.” The Child
Status Protection Act (CSPA) adjusted the calculation of a child
beneficiary’s age in order to partially correct for the effects of
administrative inefficiency in processing visa applications.193
For example, when a U.S. citizen files an immediate relative
petition for his or her unmarried child before the child’s twentyfirst birthday, that child will continue to be considered a “child”
regardless of when the visa petition is actually processed.194
The child’s age for purposes of the visa petition freezes as of the
date it was filed; therefore, the petition will not be converted to
Id.
It is apparently not unusual for petitioners with LPR status to fail to
disclose the marriages of their children. Id. § 21.2(b)(9)(B) (“One of the most frequent
problems in this area concerns petitioners who gained entry into the United States as
children or unmarried sons or daughters, and whose pending petitions establish that
they were actually married before entering the United States.”).
191 See supra Section I.B.3.
192 In re Coletti, 11 I. & N. Dec. 551, 553–54 (B.I.A. 1965); see In re Aldecoaotolora,
18 I. & N. Dec. at 431.
193 Child Status Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 107-208, § 3, 116 Stat. 927, 928
(2002) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1153(h) (2012)).
194 Id. §§ 2, 3 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1151(f)(1), 1153(h)).
189
190
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a First Preference classification. The CSPA did not address the
issue of “aging out” for the children of permanent residents.
Therefore, many children who are under twenty-one years old
at the time a petition is filed age out of the 2(A) category for
spouses and children of permanent residents and “must be
sponsored for admission under the 2(B) category” for unmarried
adult sons and daughters, resulting in “a substantially longer
wait time to obtain LPR status.”195 The CSPA does, however,
protect the beneficiaries of family petitions filed by refugees and
asylum recipients from aging out of eligibility.196 For example,
if a principal applicant applies for asylum or refugee status
before his or her child turns twenty-one, that child will
continue to be classified as a child for all eligibility determinations
related to the asylum or refugee application.
The fact that there is no such durable status protection
for beneficiaries whose marriages disqualify them from eligibility
for an immigration benefit signifies, once again, Congress’s belief
that unmarried adult children remain dependent members of
their parents’ family units, while married children—regardless
of their age—do not.197 This is a narrow definition of the family
unit that does not account for the diversity of marriage
practices and family structures around the world. It fails to
account for married minor children who remain dependent on
their parents. Underlying the law’s message that marital
status trumps minority when it comes to defining membership
in a family are old-fashioned, property-based notions of
children and women, discussed above.198
Third, although marriage disqualifies minors from
benefitting from parent-sponsored immigration petitions, there
is nothing preventing minors who are parents themselves from
being classified as children. However, the petitioning
grandparent’s status determines whether or not the grandchild
would be able to immigrate with his or her parent. There is no
direct relative petition category for grandchildren of U.S.
citizens and permanent residents, but the grandchildren of
KANDEL, supra note 51, at 18.
8 U.S.C. § 1157(c)(2)(B) (2012) (codifying the CSPA as applied to refugees);
id. § 1158(b)(3)(B) (codifying the CSPA as applied to asylees).
197 See Akhtar v. Gonzales, 406 F.3d 399, 408 (6th Cir. 2005) (“Congress very
well could have determined that older children and married children are, in general,
sufficiently independent such that they do not merit preferential treatment based on
the asylum status of their parents.”).
198 See supra Section I.C. The lack of durable status protection for marriages
affects adults who wish to marry as well. In the most extreme scenario, the unmarried
son or daughter of a permanent resident who never naturalizes must postpone marriage
for decades otherwise his or her visa petition will be automatically revoked. 8 C.F.R.
§ 205.1(a)(3)(i)(I) (2012).
195
196
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certain U.S. citizens and permanent residents can potentially
derive immigration benefits from their parents.199 For example, a
permanent resident filing a visa petition for his child in the 2(A)
category can also include his grandchild as a derivative
beneficiary. In a striking example of the poor logic within the
family-based immigration system, however, U.S. citizens filing
visa petitions for their children as immediate relatives cannot
include their grandchildren as derivative beneficiaries.200 This
is because there is no statutory language providing for the
derivative beneficiaries of immediate relatives. This effectively
separates the minor parent from her child, breaking up a family
unit despite Congress’s intentions in creating the family
preference categories.201 The children of refugees find themselves
in a similar predicament, choosing between immigrating
immediately and enduring a separation from their children or
waiting to immigrate in order to remain with their children.202
The preceding paragraph illustrates how in the familybased immigration system, it is possible for an unmarried
person who has dependent children of her own to be
characterized as a child for immigration purposes (i.e., dependent
on her parents). At the same time, a childless married minor is
not considered a child for the purpose of benefitting from a
parent-sponsored petition because she is assumed to be
dependent on her spouse. If maturity or development—rather
than dependency—informed the INA’s construction of
childhood, it is possible that these children would be categorized
differently. Embedded within these provisions, however, is
Congress’s assumptions about dependency, namely that a
minor child who is raising a child of her own is not independent
of her parents, but a married minor child is. The examples also
199 8 U.S.C. § 1153(d) (indicating that the child of a family preference
immigrant shall be entitled to the same status as his or her parent “if accompanying or
following to join”).
200 Thronson, supra note 118, at 404.
201 In this situation, families typically choose between two options, neither of
which is as good as the process available to permanent resident grandparents. The first
option is for the child to petition for her own child after she obtains LPR status as an
immediate relative, a process which would likely involve a years-long separation. 8
U.S.C. § 1153(a)(2)(A); Immigrant Numbers for September 2016, supra note 147, at 2
(indicating that visas are available for the children of permanent residents whose
petitions were filed before November 15, 2014). The second option would be for the U.S.
citizen grandparent to wait until his or her child turns twenty-one before filing a
petition for the child in the First Preference category. 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(1). The child
would have to wait longer for a visa, but she would be able to include her own child as
a derivative beneficiary. See supra Section I.B.1 for a description of limitations on
different categories of family-sponsored immigrants.
202 8 U.S.C. § 1157(c)(2) (describing entitlement to admission of the spouse or
child of a refugee, employing the definition of child in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(1)).
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illustrate how well-established principles within immigration
law—here, the superior rights of U.S. citizens compared to
permanent residents to sponsor family members to immigrate—
can become inverted when the law does not conceive of family
structures that are outside of the norm contemplated by Congress.
They also show how the law’s failure to explicitly address the
situation of married minor children can create inconsistencies in
the way that children of the same age are treated.
C.

Comparing the Treatment of Married Minor Children in
Other Immigration Contexts

The degree to which other immigration designations
and statuses for children are based on the dependency
construct varies. Special Immigrant Juvenile Status is one
such immigration benefit that strongly aligns with the familybased immigration system’s conception of the child. Here, the
child is defined in relation to an absent or otherwise unfit
parent on whom the child should have been able to depend.203
Since that parent is unavailable, another individual or entity
must step into the role of responsible parent. A married child
who is under age twenty-one is not eligible for SIJS because it
is presumed that she is no longer dependent on her parent.204
She is unequivocally excluded from eligibility for SIJS, even if
she presented an otherwise identical history of parental abuse,
abandonment, or neglect as an unmarried child. On the other
hand, if her marriage ends in annulment, divorce, or death,
and she still meets the other eligibility criteria, she will qualify
for SIJS.205 This interpretation is consistent with the INA’s
definition of “child” in the family-based immigration context: A
person under the age of twenty-one who is unmarried, even if
previously married, is presumed to be dependent on her
parents once again. Another common feature is that Congress
provided “age-out protection” for SIJS petitioners, similar to
the durable age protection provided to the children of U.S.
203 Id. § 1101(a)(27)(J)(i) (describing a special immigrant juvenile as an
immigrant “whose reunification with 1 or both of the immigrant’s parents is not viable
due to abuse, neglect, abandonment, or a similar basis found under State law”).
204 Special Immigrant Juvenile Petitions, 76 Fed. Reg. 54,978, 54,980 (Sept. 6,
2011) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. § 204.11) (“Marriage alters the dependent
relationship . . . and emancipates the child.”).
205 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(39) (defining “unmarried” to mean “an individual who at
such time is not married, whether or not previously married”); Telephone Interview
with Aryah Somers Landsberger, Dir. of Programs, Grantmakers Concerned with
Immigrants & Refugees (July 22, 2016) (recounting a case in which she engaged a
family lawyer in Guatemala to obtain a divorce for a sixteen-year-old client, who later
qualified for SIJS) (on file with author).
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citizens under the Child Status Protection Act.206 So long as
SIJS petitioners file their applications before they turn twentyone, they remain eligible for SIJS even if the petition is
adjudicated after their twenty-first birthday.207 Congress had
an opportunity to create similar protection for SIJS petitioners
who marry, but did not, relying on its assumption that
unmarried children and young adults are dependent, while
married children—regardless of their age—are not.208
The Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA)
program and the Unaccompanied Alien Child (UAC) designation
do not include eligibility criteria related to marital status. Indeed,
there is no suggestion that dependency or the performance of
activities or rituals that typically signify adulthood—such as
marriage, employment, or financial independence—would affect
an individual’s eligibility for the special treatment afforded by
either program. This represents an inconsistency in the way that
immigration law regards the significance of a minor child’s
marital status among various definitions applying to children.
Marriage does not prevent an individual from being characterized
as a child under the UAC definition or the DACA program, but it
does prevent her from being characterized as a child in the
family-based immigration system and for SIJS.209 One possible
explanation for this inconsistency is that those who drafted the
DACA policy and UAC statutes did not specifically consider the
situation of married children. Another possibility is that they did
consider the possibility and intended to treat married children the
same as unmarried children. The inconsistency could also be the
result of compromise in the legislative process.210
8 U.S.C. § 1232(d)(6).
Congress addressed this issue in part because there was ambiguity
regarding the age-related eligibility criterion. See id. In some jurisdictions, when petitioners
turned twenty-one years old, their pending SIJS petitions were automatically denied;
in others, they remained eligible. Hlass, supra note 130, at 323–24. Ambiguity remains,
however, with respect to the eligibility of individuals who are unable to obtain a
dependency order because they are between the ages of eighteen and twenty-one. See
id. State laws regarding the jurisdiction of juvenile courts vary. See id.
208 See Special Immigrant Juvenile Petitions, 76 Fed. Reg. 54,978 at 54,980
(describing USCIS’s decision to maintain the “unmarried” eligibility criterion as based
on Congress’ failure to extend durable marital status protection to SIJS petitioners).
209 See
supra Section I.B.1 (discussing children in the family-based
immigration system), I.B.2 (discussing children for purposes of the UAC designation,
the DACA program, and SIJS).
210 Although the DACA Program is immigration policy, not legislation, it was
inspired by the DREAM Act, federal legislation that would have benefited the same
population as DACA. See Barack Obama, President of the U.S., Remarks by the President
on Immigration (June 15, 2012), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/
06/15/remarks-president-immigration [https://perma.cc/A68L-3BQA] (“Precisely because
this is temporary, Congress needs to act. There is still time for Congress to pass the
DREAM Act this year, because these kids deserve to plan their lives in more than two206

207
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Whatever the reason, this difference in the treatment of
married minor children signals that the conceptions of
childhood embraced in the DACA and UAC contexts differ
slightly from the dependency construct that underlies the
family-based immigration system and SIJS. Conceptions of
childhood that include married minor children emphasize
children’s developmental distinctiveness over their dependency.
From the developmental perspective, children are essentially
incomplete, fragile, and vulnerable, and therefore deserve special
treatment and protection.211 This construct is well accepted in
the juvenile justice context, especially since the U.S. Supreme
Court recognized that children and the decisions they make
deserve special consideration: “Our history is replete with laws
and judicial recognition that minors, especially in their earlier
years, generally are less mature and responsible than adults.
Particularly during the formative years of childhood and
adolescence, minors often lack the experience, perspective and
judgment expected of adults.”212 The developmental construct
also dominates the conception of childhood under international
legal standards, which consider all persons under the age of
eighteen to be children, regardless of whether they inhabit
adult-like bodies and roles.213 A married minor child, therefore,
is still considered a child who can seek protection under
international legal standards.
The developmental construct of childhood is closely
linked with the dependency construct in that it presumes that
children do not have “the capacity and experience to exercise
year increments.”). The legislation was ultimately defeated in Congress, but, like
DACA, did not include an eligibility criterion related to marital status. See DREAM Act
of 2010, S. 3992, 111th Cong. (2010).
211 Appell, supra note 108, at 708 (“[C]hildhood is the developmental process
of becoming an adult.”); Thronson, supra note 45, at 985; Somers et al., supra note 102,
at 325 (“The developmental construction presents childhood as a progression of
cognitive and psychosocial development towards adulthood.”).
212 Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115–16 (1982).
213 See CRC, supra note 2, art. 1; U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Refugee
Children: Guidelines on Protection and Care, 27 (1994), http://www.refworld.org/docid/
3ae6b3470.html [https://perma.cc/A5L8-9ZRB] (“[G]enerally speaking they have not
fully developed the emotional maturity and judgment, nor achieved the social status, of
adults that come with life experience. . . . Their physical maturity but lack of full adult
capabilities and status also make them possible targets of exploitation . . . .”). The
definition of “child” in Article 1 of the CRC contains an exception for national laws
under which individuals may attain majority earlier than the age of eighteen. CRC,
supra note 2, art. 1. However, the UN interprets the CRC protections as applying to
everyone under the age of eighteen and seeks to empower those who have attained
majority earlier by permitting them to “claim the benefits of adulthood.” U.N. High
Comm’r for Refugees, Action for the Rights of Children: Critical Issues Abuse and
Exploitation, 4 (2001), http://www.unhcr.org/protection/children/3bb81aea4/action-rightschildren-arc-critical-issues-abuse-exploitation.html [https://perma.cc/JCH2-TVQ7].
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control over themselves or others,” and are therefore dependent
on adults for those purposes.214 Children are considered “both
different from adults and less than adults . . . not yet full
persons.”215 This is the justification for giving children special
treatment and protection, but not necessarily rights. Part III of
this article argues that these developmental facts should
inform, but need not dictate, how childhood is understood in
immigration law, particularly because of the diversity of cultures,
environments, and socioeconomic backgrounds it encounters.
III.

MOVING TOWARD A MORE THOUGHTFUL UNDERSTANDING
OF CHILDHOOD

A.

Why Reform Is Necessary

This article began with an explanation of the social
constructionist approach to understanding childhood. This
approach posits that the prevailing conception of childhood in a
given society at a given time will influence that society’s
determination of the rights that should be accorded to children.216
When the prevailing conception of childhood changes, the
understanding of children’s rights should also change. One
function of U.S. immigration law is to reflect society’s
expectations of the behavior of newcomers.217 However, the law is
based on outdated conceptions of children as dependent,
vulnerable, and unwise and no longer “synchronize[s] with
broadly held views of [children in] law and society.”218
Immigration law also holds a narrow conception of family based
on the nuclear family, an idea that has been recognized as
theoretically flawed and practically defunct in other legal
settings.219 Although the law is “framed as neutral and
objective,” it actually privileges and normalizes a particular
conception of women—and, I argue, of children as well—while
214 Appell, supra note 26, at 717; see also Appell, supra note 108, at 715 (“Until
[children] can govern themselves, they are dependent.”).
215 Appell, supra note 108, at 714–15.
216 PHILIP E. VEERMAN, THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD AND THE CHANGING IMAGE
OF CHILDHOOD 10 (1992).
217 Hiroshi Motomura, The Family and Immigration: A Roadmap for the
Ruritanian Lawmaker, 43 AM. J. COMP. L. 511, 530 (1995).
218 Thronson, supra note 118, at 395.
219 See, e.g., Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 504 (1977)
(describing nontraditional families as “equally venerable and equally deserving of
constitutional recognition”); Linda Kelly, Family Planning, American Style, 52 ALA. L.
REV. 943, 945–47 (2001); Bhabha, supra note 110, at 194 (“The assumption of a unitary
family, all of whose members share the same nationality, live in the same country, travel
together or follow the (male) bread winner, have the same short- or long-term interests,
and have easy access to each other, is outmoded.”).
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punishing or marginalizing those who defy the existing
definitions.220 Feminist and other critical theorists have
described how scientific ideas and legal constructions are based
on the perspective of a “white, male, heterosexual adult,” and
therefore marginalize the perspectives of those who fall outside
of the “norm.”221 These biases have been criticized as “cultural[ly]
myopi[c]” and “engaging in a form of racial coercion” that has
fallen from favor in the domestic family law context.222
These outdated assumptions underlying conceptions of
children and the family in immigration law are largely
unacknowledged and unexamined by those who would have the
power to change them; and yet, they continue to influence how
children are treated in the immigration system.223 As a result,
immigration law marginalizes and unfairly punishes children
for the actions and inaction of their parents, such as choosing
to enter the country without valid entry documents.224 It judges
the appropriateness of deportation primarily based on its
impact on adult, not child, deportees.225 These shortcomings in
the law are exaggerated as applied to married minor children.
In light of contemporary sociological and developmental
understandings of childhood that have filtered into domestic
law and society,226 relying on the dependency construct of
childhood in immigration law is no longer justified.
In the family-based immigration system, marital status
plays a critical role in determining who is considered a child
versus who is an adult. However, as the preceding part has
shown, the lines that immigration law has drawn reflect an
incoherent understanding of childhood, particularly as the law
applies to children who do not fit the mold created for them by the
dependency construct.227 In fact, the law functions to
Appell, supra note 26, at 738–39.
Id.
222 Kelly, supra note 219, at 963–64 (alterations in original) (quoting Moore,
431 U.S. at 507 (Brennan, J., concurring)).
223 Thronson, supra note 45, at 980.
224 Id.
225 Bhabha, supra note 110, at 192.
226 Thronson, supra note 118, at 407–08 (“In sharp contrast to the rigidity of
immigration law, mainstream approaches to families and children largely leave families
to make their own critical decisions about who is considered family. . . . Immigration law’s
exclusive use of a narrow construct of family effectively ‘negates other prevalent family
configurations which make up functional families, such as single-parent households,
grandparent-grandchild households, same-sex couples, polygamous marriages, and
extended family configurations.’” (footnote omitted) (quoting Shani M. King, U.S.
Immigration Law and the Traditional Nuclear Conception of Family: Toward a
Functional Definition of Family That Protects Children’s Fundamental Human Rights,
41 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 509, 515 (2010))).
227 See supra Part II.
220
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disadvantage married minor children vis-à-vis unmarried minor
children and married adult children. Minors whose marriages
are recognized by USCIS are not considered adults for the
purpose of petitioning for their parents and spouses, and are not
considered children for the purpose of benefitting from a parentsponsored petition. They are limited by immigration law’s
constructions of childhood, in the former case, and family, in
the latter case.
Although there is a need for reform in the way that
immigration law understands childhood as a whole, focusing on
reforming the family-based immigration laws as applied to
married minor children is a good first step for two reasons: First,
because the current laws’ failure to acknowledge the existence of
married minor children makes a potentially vulnerable
population invisible; and second, because the injustice of the
laws as applied is particularly stark.
B.

A Critical, Child-Centered Approach

U.S. immigration law does not and cannot account for
all of the differences in geography, socioeconomic status, and
culture that influence constructions of childhood and family
around the world. Each country’s approach to the treatment of
children in its immigration laws is informed by its own
domestic laws, policy agendas, and respect for international
human rights norms.228 For example, the question of whether
citizen children should have the right to create immigration
status for their parents requires balancing the child’s interest
in family reunification with the state’s interest in controlling
the number of immigrants it admits and the bases for their
admission.229 The challenge for U.S. immigration law is to
address its incoherent treatment of children without throwing out
its core principles and assumptions.230 It can do this by moving
toward an understanding of childhood and family that is informed
by child-centered approaches and critical theory. This section
describes how a critical, child-centered approach can empower
children, recognizing their independence and autonomy, while
still acknowledging their need for care and protection.
Bhabha, supra note 110, at 201–02.
Id.
230 The core principles of U.S. immigration law and policy are currently
contested, but have historically included “(1) family reunification; (2) admission of
persons with needed skills; (3) refugee protection; and (4) country-of-origin diversity.”
KANDEL, supra note 51, at 1. A core assumption of U.S. immigration law and policy as
they relate to children is that children are dependent on their parents for protection,
socialization, and meeting their basic needs. See supra Section I.C.
228
229
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The principle at the heart of a child-centered approach
is that children have participation rights that are similar to
those of adults, but they also may claim special assistance to
effectuate those rights because of their age.231 This approach
takes into account the impact of culture and environment on a
child’s individual development.232 It permits children to exercise
a flexible range of rights consistent with their individual levels
of cognitive development, maturity, independence, and comfort.
Importantly, it requires that children have a say in decisions
that affect their lives.233
The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the
Child (CRC) is a well-known representation of the childcentered approach. It replaced prior attempts to conceptualize
the needs and rights of children around the world that were
based on a dependency construct of childhood.234 Since U.S.
immigration agencies already consult international human
rights norms in certain immigration law contexts, the CRC
might be considered a potential source of guidance on the
treatment of children.235 However, scholars have criticized the
CRC and child-centered jurisprudence for failing to challenge the
essence of the dependency construct.236 Although children are
considered people first—just like adults—their ability to exercise
the rights of personhood is ultimately limited by their incomplete
development.237 The CRC embraces the legal categorization and
subordination of the child by defining the child as a “human
being below the age of eighteen years unless under the law
applicable to the child, majority is attained earlier.”238 Its
description of childhood as a time of education, play, and limited
responsibility indicates its agreement with the developmental
construct of childhood.239 The CRC does not address children’s
See, e.g., Appell, supra note 26, at 719.
Somers et al., supra note 102, at 326.
233 CRC, supra note 2, art. 12(1) (assuring “the child who is capable of forming his
or her own views the right to express those views freely in all matters affecting the child”).
234 See, e.g., Appell, supra note 26, at 733 (noting the CRC’s significance for
“recognizing children not as property but as human beings who should have identities,
procedural rights, and moral rights” (footnotes omitted)); Jonathan Todres, A Child
Rights-Based Approach to Reconstruction in Haiti, 6 INTERCULTURAL HUM. RTS. L.
REV. 43, 68–70 (2011) (describing the CRC’s role in advancing children’s rights after
the 2010 earthquake in Haiti).
235 See, e.g., Thronson, supra note 45, at 988.
236 Appell, supra note 26, at 717.
237 Ann Quennerstedt, Children, but Not Really Humans? Critical Reflections on
the Hampering Effect of the “3p’s”, 18 INT’L J. CHILD. RTS. 619, 631–32 (2010) (criticizing
the CRC’s failure to contemplate political rights for children).
238 CRC, supra note 2, art. 1; see id. art. 5 (describing children as having
“evolving capacities”).
239 Id. art. 31 (“State parties recognize the right of the child to rest and
leisure, to engage in play and recreational activities . . . .”).
231
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relationships outside of their relationships with parents, the
state, and schools.240 Finally, the CRC does not address the issue
of how to conceive of married minor children. Although
international efforts to regulate child marriage began decades
ago, scholars have criticized the discourse as dominated by western
assumptions about children as dependent, weak, vulnerable, and
powerless.241 By adopting a “universalist psychological model of the
child,” these efforts, like U.S. immigration law, disempower and fail
to accommodate children from societies that do not share the
western model of childhood.242
Any reform of the family-based immigration system that
aims to adopt a critical, child-centered approach for the
treatment of married minor children must consider the cultural
constructions of childhood in its analysis. It must recognize that
social constructions of childhood rooted in political and legal
systems created the idea of children as inherently vulnerable, and
not the other way around.243 It must accommodate the complexity
of global perspectives on childhood while still recognizing the
negative impact that early marriage has on girls’ lives.244 It must
take into account the socioeconomic conditions in which girls
marry and the role that their families play post-marriage in the
process of determining their rights. It must move away from
the old approach of vilifying cultural practices and instead
draw attention to the actions of developed nations that
contribute to the systemic causes of early marriage. And it
must ensure that children have more than just a “voice” in
decisions concerning their lives. A critical child-centered
approach will follow the lead of feminist jurisprudence and ask:
What purpose does the designation of childhood serve? Who
benefits from the construction of childhood and who suffers?
How can the law function to correct for outdated and irrelevant
assumptions about children?
At a minimum, a critical child-centered approach
ensures that children are the authors of “what they want as
240 Appell, supra note 108, at 724 (describing how law school textbooks on
children and the law do not typically cover or inquire about other types of relationships
that children may have).
241 Bunting, supra note 8, at 32 (describing global regulation of the issue of
child marriage as being “grounded in a colonial project”).
242 Appell, supra note 26, at 729–33 & n.96 (quoting ALLISON JAMES, CHRIS
JENKS & ALAN PROUT, supra note 24, at 141); James, From the Child’s Point of View,
supra note 24, at 45, 52. But see Warner, supra note 10, at 247–48 (criticizing
international convention addressing child marriage for being overly deferential to local
cultural and religious practices and for failing to recognize the “special vulnerabilities
of children” with respect to free consent to marriage).
243 Appell, supra note 26, at 718.
244 Bunting, supra note 8, at 31.
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children.”245 Immigration policy has been dominated by concerns
about how family separation impacts adults, without
consideration of the child’s perspective at all.246 When children’s
views are taken into account in child-centered approaches, it is
done in the context of determining “the best interests of the
child.”247 Ultimately, however, it is an adult’s opinion of what is
in a child’s best interest that matters.248 The critical childcentered approach regards children as “independent and
reliable informants” about their lives and accords primacy—not
mere consideration—to their views on the extent to which they
wish to exercise their rights as people and the support they
need in order to do so effectively.249 It treats children with
dignity, takes their opinions seriously, and enables them to
exercise their rights as people to the fullest extent.
C.

First Steps Toward Improving the Treatment of Married
Minor Children

This section proposes two steps toward correcting the
incoherent understanding of childhood in U.S. immigration
law. If realized, these changes could serve as a model for
making incremental improvements in the treatment of children
throughout the immigration system, regardless of the number
of immigrant petitions they would affect directly. Together,
these improvements would chip away at the dependency
construct that underlies the inequities facing immigrant
children. Practically, they address the double disadvantage
that married minors face relative to unmarried minor children
and married adult children. There is no basis for concern that
these reforms to treat married minor children in a more
thoughtful way would promote or encourage the practice of
child marriage. Parents who marry off their daughters at a
245 Appell, supra note 108, at 756; James, From the Child’s Point of View,
supra note 24, at 52–53 (“[T]he study of childhood need no longer simply be the adult study
of children’s socialisation or child development. . . . To understand ‘childhood’ . . . we should
ask children themselves.”).
246 See Bhabha, supra note 110, at 200–01 (“It is a strange paradox of modern
public policy that children are considered to have a fundamental right to family life and
yet no legally enforceable right, unlike their adult counterparts, to initiate family reunion
or resist family separation where a family is divided by national borders.” (footnotes
omitted)).
247 CRC, supra note 2, art. 3(1) (assuring that “the best interests of the child
will be a primary consideration” in all actions concerning children).
248 Thronson, supra note 45, at 989.
249 James, From the Child’s Point of View, supra note 24, at 53; Bhabha, supra
note 110, at 206 (describing “an approach that explores the substantive meaning of a
right from the perspective of the affected applicant, in this case a baby, rather than
from the standpoint of a generic adult claimant”).
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young age and the spouses who marry them are neither
rewarded nor punished for those actions. Rather, the major
effect of the reforms is to make married minor children visible
in a legal regime that treats them like people, not property, nor
wards, nor lost causes.
1. Permit Married Minor Children to Petition for Their
Parents and Siblings
The INA should be amended to permit married minor
U.S. citizen children to petition for their parents and siblings.
Under the INA, only U.S. citizens who are age twenty-one and
over may successfully file immigrant visa petitions for their
parents and siblings.250 Married minor children are treated no
differently than unmarried minor children in this context. This
result does not make sense, even using the logic of the
dependency construct. If USCIS has recognized a marriage that
alters a minor’s dependency relationship with her parents,
such that she is no longer dependent on them for care, she is
effectively an adult for all other purposes in the family-based
immigration system. When USCIS recognizes the marriage of a
minor, it enables the married minor child to reunite with her
spouse in the role of either petitioner or beneficiary. The law
recognizes that the minor child has created a new family
relationship, and it should therefore also recognize her legally
enforceable right to protect family unity.251 There is no logical
or practical reason to deny that right to a minor who is treated
like an adult for all other purposes. Outside of the family-based
immigration context, children are permitted to present
independent claims for immigration status and, therefore,
exercise some autonomy over immigration decisions.252 It would
not be a radical departure to permit married minor children,
who are otherwise treated as adults, to petition for their
parents and siblings.

See supra Section II.A.1.
See generally Office of Immigration Statistics, supra note 21 (providing
evidence of USCIS approval of spousal immigrant visas for persons under the age of
eighteen).
252 Thronson, supra note 45, at 995 & n.103 (providing as an example the fact
that children may independently apply for asylum when they fear persecution in their
native countries).
250

251
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2. Parent-Sponsored Visa Petitions: Analyze the
Dependency Relationship Between Parents and
Married Minor Children
When parents file visa petitions for their married minor
children, USCIS should analyze the dependency relationship
between the petitioner and beneficiary before determining the
preference classification of the beneficiary. Married minor
children who are wholly or partially dependent on their U.S.
citizen parents should be classified as immediate relatives, and
their spouses should receive provisional visas to immigrate to the
United States. Similarly, married minor children who are
dependent on their permanent resident parents should be
considered Second Preference (2A) immigrants and their spouses
granted provisional visas within that classification. In
determining whether or not a minor child is dependent on her
parents, USCIS should take a totality-of-the-circumstances
approach and consider all evidence submitted by the petitioner
and beneficiary regarding the relationship between the two. This
would include all evidence of financial, legal, social, and emotional
ties between the petitioner and beneficiary.
This proposal challenges the dependency construct of
childhood by treating a married minor child as both a child of her
parents and a married spouse. It requires USCIS to investigate
the actual nature of the financial and emotional relationship
between parents and children—an activity similar to determining
whether a marriage is bona fide, which USCIS already does.253
Like the existing process, USCIS officers in this case would
approve a petition so long as they determined that the parentchild relationship was valid and that the dependent relationship
was not being claimed solely for immigration purposes. USCIS
may develop a nonexclusive list of indications that a dependent
relationship may have been claimed solely for immigration
benefits—for example, if the beneficiary has an independent
source of substantial income or controls valuable assets. In line
with the critical child-centered approach, the beneficiary child’s
perspective is just as important as the petitioner parent’s
perspective in the adjudication of the petition. The married minor
child’s ability to move to a higher preference classification can be
considered an accommodation on account of her youth.254
253 U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., supra note 85, § 21.3(a)(2)(H)
(describing interview process for determining whether a marriage is bona fide).
254 See Appell, supra note 26, at 754 (describing an “accommodationist approach”
to children’s rights that both enhances children’s liberty and accounts for their
vulnerability).
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This approach directly acknowledges the diversity of
marital practices around the world. Certainly, the immigration
system cannot function by adopting a completely subjective,
culture-dependent interpretation of marriage; but it also need
not unquestioningly apply its own stereotypes and biases about
child marriage to assess the motivations of foreigners.255 By
focusing on the actual dependency relationship between petitioner
parents and married minor children as the source of immigration
rights, the proposal does not stray too far from the dependency
construct at the heart of the family-based immigration system.
Finally, this approach permits the U.S. government to credibly
condemn the deleterious consequences of child marriage—which
it already does, led by the Department of State and the United
States Agency for International Development—while still being
sensitive to different understandings of the terms “child” and
“marriage” in different cultures.
CONCLUSION
Long-standing assumptions about dependency, marriage,
and the family underlie the construction of childhood in U.S.
immigration law. These assumptions recall an earlier set of
assumptions that once applied to women and that are now
understood as discriminatory and socially constructed. This
article presents arguments for reforming U.S. immigration law
as applied to children and focuses on the treatment of married
minor children in the family-based immigration system. This
subgroup of immigrant children is treated inconsistently as
either married adults or unmarried children; such inconsistent
treatment doubles the disadvantages they face relative to both
groups. Reforming the law’s treatment of married minor
children in the family-based immigration system is a first step
toward incorporating a critical child-centered perspective into
the immigration law. In an era of unprecedented child
immigration to the United States and predicted increases in the
number of child marriages globally, immigration law should
reflect a contemporary understanding of childhood.

255 See Bhabha, supra note 110, at 197–98 (describing the British Government’s
moderation of the application of the “primary purpose rule,” which restricted the entry of
young South Asian men based on an assumption that the primary purpose of an arranged
marriage to a British-born woman was the husband’s immigration into Britain).

